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ARTICLES
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ACTIVIST
DISTRESSED DEBT INVESTING
Michelle M. Harner*
Activist institutional investors traditionally have invested in a company's
equity to try to influence change at the company. Some of these investors,
however, are now purchasing a company's debt for this same purpose.
They may seek to change a company's management and board personnel,
operational strategies, asset holdings, or capital structure.
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Allied Holdings, Inc. and its
affiliates exemplify the strategies of activist distressed debt investors. In the
Allied cases, Yucaipa Companies, a distressed debt investor, purchased
approximately 66% of Allied's outstanding general unsecured bond debt.
Yucaipa used this debt position to exert significant influence over Allied's
Chapter 11 cases and business operations, including its labor contract with
the Teamsters. Yucaipa emerged as Allied's majority shareholder under
Allied's confirmed plan of reorganization.
Allied is not an isolated example. In 2006, distressed debt investors
raised a record $19 billion in investment funds. The research shows that
some investors are using these investment funds for activist purposes.
Indeed, activist distressed debt investing is on the rise in both the United
States and the United Kingdom. This activism is changing the dynamics of
corporate restructurings and presenting new challenges for corporate
management and public policy makers.
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College of Business Administration. I also appreciate the very helpful comments from Steve
Bradford, Colleen Medill, Christopher Mirick, Juliet Moringiello, Susan Poser, Nancy
Rapoport, and Sandy Shandro; the assistance of various restructuring professionals in the
United States and the United Kingdom; and the assistance of my very talented research
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INTRODUCTION
Can an unsecured creditor influence the general corporate affairs of its
debtor company? Yes. Consider the Chapter 11 cases of Allied Holdings,
Inc. and certain of its affiliates. Allied is the largest vehicle transporter in
North America. 1 In July 2005, Allied filed a bankruptcy case under
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.2 Its primary debt obligations at
the time consisted of approximately $180 million in secured bank financing,
$150 million in unsecured notes, and $47 million in other unsecured debt.3
In May 2006, two funds owned by the Yucaipa Companies purchased $98.8
million of Allied's unsecured notes. Yucaipa emerged as the single largest
holder of Allied's prebankruptcy debt.4
Yucaipa then used its debt position to control the direction and the
outcome of Allied's restructuring efforts. Yucaipa negotiated directly with
the company and the company's unsecured creditors' committee regarding
the company's business and financial restructuring plan.5 It also negotiated
directly with the company's labor union to obtain necessary concessions on
the company's labor contract. 6 When the dust settled, Allied emerged from
1. Disclosure Statement for Joint Plan of Reorganization of Allied Holdings, Inc. and
Affiliated Debtors Proposed by the Debtors, Yucaipa and the Teamsters National
Automobile Transportation Industry Negotiating Committee at 14-15, In re Allied Holdings,
Inc., No. 05-12515 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2007) (Docket No. 2562) [hereinafter Allied
Disclosure Statement].
2. Allied Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 24, 2007).
3. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 5, 7-9, 19-20, 40 (showing total of
$196.6 million in general unsecured claims, which includes $150 million in unsecured
notes).
4. Id. at20-21.
5. Id. at 3-4.
6. Id. at 34-35, 45; see also John R. Emshwiller, Controversy, by the Truckload, WALL
ST. J., May 2, 2007, at A4 (explaining that Allied first "allowed Yucaipa to assist the
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bankruptcy with approximately $200 million less debt, a new secured
financing facility, a modified labor contract, and a new controlling
shareholder-Yucaipa. 7
The primary lesson of Allied is simple: institutional investor activism no
longer is confined to a company's shareholders. An investor now has an
alternative, and additional, avenue for activism--distressed debt. An
investor can purchase the debt of a financially troubled company and then
try to influence corporate matters by exercising or threatening to exercise its
contractual and statutory rights as a debtholder. This Article refers to this
type of activity by an investor as "activist distressed debt investing."
Activist distressed debt investing is changing the dynamics of corporate
restructurings. 8 Large creditors, rather than the debtor's management, are
now making key decisions in the debtor's restructuring process. These
decisions may or may not benefit the debtor and its other stakeholders.
This development is particularly notable in the United States, where
financially troubled companies historically have had the upper hand in
restructuring negotiations with debt and equity holders. The U.S.
bankruptcy laws generally are viewed as prodebtor, allowing the
management of a debtor company to stay in control of the company
throughout the restructuring process, absent extraordinary circumstances. 9
In fact, U.S. bankruptcy was once viewed by company management as a
defensive measure to hostile takeover bids.10  But the tides may be
changing.
company in talks seeking contract concessions from the Teamsters," and then "Yucaipa
began negotiating with the Teamsters on its own").
7. See Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 1.01 (June 4, 2007);
Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 31, 2007); Allied
Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 1.03 (May 24, 2007).
8. See, e.g., Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical
Study of Investors' Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 69 (2008) (discussing the
changing dynamics in U.S. corporate restructurings and the potential implications for cases
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
9. See, e.g., DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION 212-32 (2001) (discussing
prodebtor aspects of Chapter 11 in an historical context); id. at 216 (noting that Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code adopted "an explicitly manager-friendly approach to corporate
reorganization"); J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213,
293-301 (1991) (explaining management control in Chapter 11 process and observing that
"[m]anagement's postpetition control of a debtor's operations is complemented by specific,
individual Code provisions which give management substantial control over the
reorganization process itself"); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate
Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 669, 688-94 (1993) (explaining historical grounds for management control in
Chapter 11 context); see also George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 19, 21-23 (2004) (explaining that "[s]ince [the Bankruptcy Code's enactment,] it has
been portrayed as a debtor-friendly statute featuring a fresh start for debtors and the prospect
of reorganization for businesses" and positing that such portrayal may be erroneous (footnote
omitted)).
10. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1237 n.85 (2006) ("'Chapter 11,
like many takeover defensive measures, is justified by its supporters as a mechanism to
preserve and protect valuable corporate assets."' (quoting Michael Bradley & Michael
(Vol. 77
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Creditors are now asserting more control in the restructuring process."I
This shift in control plays into the hands of activist institutional investors in
the distressed debt market. It also appears to align the U.S. restructuring
process more closely with the traditionally more creditor-friendly process of
the United Kingdom.12 These changes come at a time when other countries
are working to revamp their corporate bankruptcy laws to reflect a
traditional U.S.-style restructuring-that is, a debtor-controlled process. 13
Notably, Allied is not an isolated example. The number of reported
instances of distressed debtholders seeking to influence change at, or
acquire, the issuer company has increased over the past ten years in both the
United States and the United Kingdom. High profile U.S. cases include
FiberMark Inc., Kmart Corporation, Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corp.,
Maidenform Brands, Inc., McLeodUSA Inc., National Equipment Services,
Inc., New World Pasta Company, Rand McNally & Co., Regal
Entertainment Group, and XO Communications, Inc. 14 In the United
Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1050 (1992))); David
A. Skeel, Jr., Doctrines and Markets: Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003) ("Chapter ll no longer
functions like an anti-takeover device for managers; it has become, instead, the most
important new frontier in the market for corporate control, complete with asset sales and
faster cases.").
11. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 1237-42 (explaining increased
creditor control exercised through financing contracts); Skeel, supra note 10, at 923-27
(same).
12. See, e.g., Nathalie Martin, Common-Law Bankruptcy Systems: Similarities and
Differences, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 367, 392-97 (2003) ("Although major strides
have been made toward allowing a business to rehabilitate, the new [U.K.] laws attempt to
achieve these goals through proceedings that are entirely creditor driven."); Karin S.
Thorbum, Corporate Governance Practices in Europe: Antidote to Enron?, 27 VT. L. REV.
887, 891 (2003) ("Creditors, and in particular secured lenders, are comparatively well
protected in the United Kingdom. The U.K. insolvency procedures are strictly creditor-
oriented."); see also Andy Scruton & Lee Smith, Introduction to the United Kingdom's
Enterprise Act 2002, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2004, at 36, 36 ("The United Kingdom
has historically been perceived as a creditor-friendly jurisdiction, particularly with respect to
secured creditors.").
13. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, White's Wheel, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 193, 197-
98 (2004) (discussing adoption of U.S. bankruptcy customs by other countries); Nathalie
Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems:
The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) ("As a
result, many countries have attempted to create a reorganization scheme for failing
enterprises like Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11), in which management
stays in place and manages the reorganizing company."); Todd J. Zywicki, Legal History:
The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2033
(2003) (reviewing SKEEL, supra note 9) ("All around the world, other nations are beginning
to adopt some of the features of U.S. bankruptcy law."); see also Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing
Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign Debtors Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469, 470-71 (2006) ("[A] few countries have recently adopted
expedited bankruptcy procedures akin to the U.S. prepack."). U.K. bankruptcy laws were
amended in 1986 and 2002 to' adopt a more "rescue-oriented" approach for corporate
reorganizations. See Martin, supra note 12, at 392; see also infra Part III.A.2.
14. See, e.g., In re FiberMark, Inc., 339 B.R. 321 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006) (FiberMark
case); Phyllis Berman, XO Communications KOs Allegiance Bidders, FORBES.COM, Feb. 13,
2004, http://www.forbes.com/2004/02/13/cz-pb-0213allegiance.html (XO Communications
2008]
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Kingdom, the list includes Cordiant Communications Group, Damovo
Group, Drax Group, Energis Communications Ltd., Gate Gourmet Group,
Jarvis plc, Marconi plc, MyTravel Group plc, Polestar Group, Schefenacker
plc, and Telewest Communications plc.15  Institutional investors
increasingly are looking to the distressed debt market not only to make a
quick profit, but also to create value by proactively influencing corporate
governance. They may seek to change a company's management and board
personnel, operational strategies, asset holdings, or capital structure. 16
Yet the use of distressed debt holdings to monitor and influence
corporate governance has received little attention in legal scholarship
regarding institutional investor activism.17 This Article seeks to fill this
case); Terry Brennan, JLL Partners Keeps New World Pasta, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 18, 2005
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (New World Pasta case); Lisa Gewirtz, Equipment
Rental Firms a Hot Item, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 24, 2006 (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (National Equipment Services case); Kmart Exits Chapter 11, Names New
Chairman, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 2003, at 5 (Krnart case); Peter Lauria & Kelly Holman,
Patience Pays for Onex, DAILY DEAL, June 21, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(Loews case); Judy McDermott, BNP Paribas Slips into Maidenform Financing, BANK
LOAN REP., Apr. 5, 2004, at 3 (Maidenform case); John E. Morris, LPs Go Down-Market,
DAILY DEAL, Apr. 26, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Regal Entertainment
Group case); Chris Nolter, McLoedUSA to Seek Lenders' OK, DAILY DEAL, Oct. 19, 2005
(on file with the Fordham Law Review) (McLeod case); Prepacks Offer Creditors Unusual
Opportunity for 100% Recovery, MANAGING CREDIT RECEIVABLES & COLLECTIONS, Mar.
2003, at 1 (Rand McNally case).
15. See, e.g., £800M Tag on Energis as Banks Plan an Exit, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 12, 2005,
at 105, available at LEXIS, The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (London) File (Energis
case); Roger Baird, Debt Restructuring Helps Get Jarvis Back on Track, FIN. WK. (U.K.),
May 4, 2005, at 10, available at http://www.financeweek.co.uk/item/1333 (Jarvis case); Liz
Chong, US Hedge Fund Stalks MyTravel, TIMES (London), July 24, 2006, at 40 (MyTravel
case); Bill Condie, Cordiant Aussie Buyout Saved, EVENING STANDARD (U.K.), May 14,
2003, at 32, available at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-4820382-details/
Cordiant+Aussie+buyout+saved/article.do (Cordiant case); Ambrose Evans-Pritchard,
German Bankruptcy Laws Drive Car Mirror Firm to UK, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov.
8, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2950351/German-bankruptcy-
laws-drive-car-mirror-firm-to-UK.html (Schefenacker case); James Quinn, Damovo Failure
to Be 'First of Many,' DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 23, 2006, at 25, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2952830/Damovo-white-flag-to-be-first-of-many.html
(DaMovo case); UK's Drax Group Rejects £1.9 Billion Hedge Fund Offer as Too Low,
EURO. DAILY ELECTRICITY MARKETS, Sept. 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14814487
(Drax case); John Waples, Marconi Sells Off Tech Arm for £50 Million, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), June 16, 2002, at Business 3 (Marconi case); Press Release, Polestar Group,
Polestar Group Agrees Recapitalisation (Aug. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.tmlserver.co.uk/polestamews.nsf/polestarpr/98C5E3440D8D I F4D8025723E003
982DC!OpenDocument (Polestar case); Gate Gourmet Says Lenders Not Calling in Debts,
FORBES.COM, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2005/08/17/afx2183
232.html (Gate Gourmet case); Katherine Griffiths, Telewest Deal Gives Bondholders
98.5%, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 16, 2003, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
business/news/telewest-deal-gives-bondholders-985-580077.html (Telewest case).
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. Much of the existing legal scholarship focuses on either lender control through
financing contracts or increased creditor influence in the Chapter 11 context. See, e.g.,
Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 921 (2007);
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10; Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Creditor
Control in Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005
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void. It uses a combination of empirical data and selected case studies to
provide support for its conclusions.]8
The data suggest two key findings. First, some institutional investors are
strategically using distressed debt investments to influence corporate
governance and, in some instances, acquire the company.19 Second, activist
distressed debt investing is causing a slow, but noticeable, convergence of
the U.S. and the U.K. corporate restructuring processes. 20 Specifically, in
both countries, distressed debt investors are increasingly taking charge of
the restructuring process and placing the management of the troubled
company in a secondary or supporting role. For this reason, this Article
characterizes the prevailing restructuring process as a "management-
neutral" process, which differs from a "management-driven" (historically
associated with U.S. bankruptcy laws) or "management-displacing"
(historically associated with U.K. bankruptcy laws) process.21
The increasing influence of activist distressed debt investors and the
development of a management-neutral restructuring process raise a new set
of policy issues for U.S. and U.K. policy makers to consider. Distressed
debt investors may provide much needed financing and, in some cases,
operational guidance to troubled companies. Their investment goals,
however, may or may not align with the goals of the company, the
company's other stakeholders, and the underlying bankruptcy regime.
Consequently, the appropriate role of distressed debt investors in the
corporate restructuring process requires thoughtful consideration and
discussion. This Article provides research and analysis of the relevant
issues to further and enhance that discussion.
Part I provides basic background information on the distressed debt
market. It then introduce the practice of activist distressed debt investing
through the four case studies described in Part II. Each case study is based
(1994); Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1019 (2007); Skeel, supra note 10; George G. Triantis & Ronald J.
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1073
(1995); Greg McGlaun, Lender Control in Chapter 11: Empirical Evidence (Feb. 5, 2007)
(working paper), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=961365.
Edward I. Altman, the Max L. Heine Professor of Finance at the Stem School of Business,
New York University, and Stuart C. Gilson, Professor of Finance at the Harvard Business
School, have conducted extensive research on the distressed debt market, and this Article
references their respective works throughout. See, e.g., infra notes 23, 26, 32, 43, 347
(Altman); infra notes 22, 46, 226 (Gilman).
18. For a detailed discussion of the survey and its results, see Hamer, supra note 8, pts.
III, IV. The case studies are set forth in Part II infra.
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See infra Part III.C. This Article uses the phrase "restructuring process," as opposed
to "restructuring law" or "restructuring culture," because, as discussed below, differences
continue to exist between U.S. and U.K. corporate bankruptcy laws and cultures. See infra
Part III.C.5.
21. See generally John Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution
of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1699 (2002)
(describing management-driven process prevalent in the United States and management-
displacing process prevalent in the United Kingdom).
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on a high-profile corporate restructuring in either the United States or the
United Kingdom that involved institutional investors as distressed
debtholders. The companies studied are Allied Holdings, Inc.,
Schefenacker plc, Jarvis plc, and Kmart Corporation.
Part III analyzes the details of the four case studies in light of U.S. and
U.K. restructuring processes, laws, and cultures. It first compares and
contrasts the opportunities for activist distressed debt investing under U.S.
and U.K. corporate restructuring laws. It then analyzes the primary
objectives and strategies of activist investors in U.S. and U.K.
restructurings. This analysis leads to a discussion of U.S. and U.K.
restructuring processes. The Article concludes in Part IV with some
general observations and comments on activist distressed debt investing and
management neutrality in the restructuring process.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET
The distressed debt market emerged as a popular investment strategy for
institutional investors in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 22 The market
attracted additional investors in the early 2000s. 23 The telecom bust and
corporate scandals of the time presented enticing investment opportunities
for high-risk players.
Since then, the market has continued to grow. In 2006, distressed debt
investors raised a record $19 billion in investment funds.24 Fundraising in
2007 is projected to break this record.25 Distressed debt investors can raise
22. The practice of buying distressed debt in the United States began in the early 1930s
in the aftermath of the Great Depression. See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS
7-10 (rev. ed. 2000); see also Jay Krasoff & John O'Neill, The Role of Distressed Investing
and Hedge Funds in Turnarounds and Buyouts and How This Affects Middle-Market
Companies, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2006, at 17, 17. It then morphed into a more
sophisticated and activist investment practice with the stock failure of 1987 and the
corporate failures that followed. See STUART C. GILSON, CREATING VALUE THROUGH
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 188-90 (2001); ROSENBERG, supra, at 16-17. Corporate debt
defaults in the U.S. soared from $4 billion in 1988 to over $18 billion in 1991, and corporate
bankruptcy filings increased from 18,889 to 27,493 during the same period. See ROSENBERG,
supra, at 16; Gilson, supra, at 189 (noting that, in 1992, "one estimate placed the total
amount of U.S. corporate debt that was either distressed or in default at $159 billion (face
value)"). "Large [junk bond] issuers such as LTV, Eastern Airlines, Texaco, Continental
Airlines, Allied Stores, Federated Department Stores, Greyhound and Pan Am filed for
protection of Chapter II of the US Bankruptcy Code." FRANQOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE
FUNDS: MYTHS AND LIMITS 101 (2002).
23. See EDWARD I. ALTMAN, NYU SALOMON CTR., ARE HISTORICALLY BASED DEFAULT
AND RECOVERY MODELS IN THE HIGH-YIELD AND DISTRESSED DEBT MARKETS STILL
RELEVANT IN TODAY'S CREDIT ENVIRONMENT? 5 fig.3 (2006), available at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/-ealtman/Are-Historical-Models-Still-Relevantl.pdf (showing spike in the size of
the defaulted and distressed debt market during 2000-2003, which peaked at over $900
billion in face value in 2002).
24. See Heidi Moore, Distressed Debt Fundraising Hits Record, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, July
13, 2007, http://www.efinancialnews.com/usedition/index/content/2448303706.
25. Id. ("Dow Jones Private Equity analyst found that distressed-debt firms raised $23.7
billion in the first six months of 2007, which is the highest volume of fundraising in any full
year to date.").
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this level of funding because, among other things, their funds generally
perform as well as, or better than, more traditional markets. 26 The trend of
increased activity and interest in the distressed debt market shows no signs
of retreat, particularly with predictions of the inevitable economic downturn
in the business cycle.2 7 In fact, well-known institutional investors such as
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, HSBC, and Carlyle have established distressed
debt funds to take advantage of this trend.28
26. See, e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN & JEFFREY SWANSON, NYU SALOMON CTR., THE
INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE AND MARKET SIZE OF DEFAULTED BONDS AND BANK LOANS:
2006 REVIEW AND 2007 OUTLOOK 3 (2007), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-ealtman/
2006%20InvestPerf.pdf ("The return of the Combined Altman NYU Salomon Center [long-
only, gross return] Index was 23.40% .... [The index] outpaced the good performances of
the S&P 500 Stock Index (+15.80%) and Citigroup's High-Yield Bond Index (+11.85%).");
see also HEDGEFUND.NET, HFN AVERAGES: APRIL PERFORMANCE REPORT 3 (2007),
available at http://www.hedgefund.net/dailyemailreports/HFNAveragesApril_07_
Report.pdf (showing annual returns for 2005 and 2006 for hedge funds investing in
distressed debt as 14.91% and 8.23%, respectively, compared with an aggregate average
return for all hedge funds of 11.99% and 8.99%).
27. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24 ("The drumbeat of disaster around the credit markets
has been growing louder and more insistent."); see also Kabir Chibber & John Glover,
Looming Crash Prompts Jump in Distressed Debt Hiring, BLOOMBERG, May 30, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=as4lgwxvySmQ&refer=h
ome ("Restructuring groups are growing faster in Europe than in the U.S. as companies in
the U.K., France and Germany pile on record amounts of debt, according to Standard &
Poor's."); Helen Fowler, Wind of Change for Distressed Debt, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 1,
2007, http://www.efinancialnews.com/usedition/index/content/1047285255 ("Private equity
firms, hedge funds, traditional long-only equity managers and fixed income managers are
moving into distressed debt in preparation for a potential credit market downturn.").
Interestingly, investors' interest levels have remained high despite a slower distressed
market. For example, in the United States, distressed bonds were reported at 4.4% of all
non-investment grade bonds in April 2006, down from averages of 6.2% in 2005 and 7% in
2004. See Liz Moyer, Dunking Distressed Debt, FORBES.COM, May 2, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/funds/2006/05/01/distressed-debt-hedge-funds-cx lm 0502debt.html;
STANDARD & POOR'S, U.S. DISTRESSED DEBT MONTHLY MONITOR: GLOBAL FIXED INCOME
RESEARCH (Apr. 2006), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixed
income/DistressReport_April2006.pdf. Nevertheless, observers predict that "the size of the
defaulted and distressed markets will increase considerably in the next two years as both new
defaults and an increasing distress ratio add to the supply of distressed debt." ALTMAN &
SWANSON, supra note 26, at 3. In addition, distressed debt investors are "poised to buy
distressed commercial real-estate assets from ailing institutions" and become more active
participants in that particular distressed space. Lingling Wei & Peter Grant, Some Vulture
Funds Set to Buy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at A10.
28. Liz Moyer, The Heirs of Michael Milken?, FORBES.COM, Mar. 7, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/03/06/unk-bond-funds-cx lmO3O7junk.html; see
also Moore, supra note 24 (noting new distressed debt funds established by Centerline
Capital Group, Cerberus Capital Management, and Oaktree Capital Management, among
others); The Vultures Take Wing, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2007, at 77, 77 (noting that Barclays
hired an entire team from Oaktree Capital Management to head up a new distressed fund).
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A. Distressed Debt and Distressed Debt Investors
1. Types of Distressed Debt
The phrase "distressed debt" is subject to multiple, often imprecise
definitions. 29  Some investors define distressed debt narrowly as the
indebtedness of a company that has commenced or is expected to
commence a bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding. 30 Other investors define
the phrase more broadly as indebtedness with a yield to maturity of 1000
basis points over the riskless rate of return. 31 The phrase essentially is used
to describe the debt of a financially troubled company that carries a high
risk of default or nonpayment and, in turn, a potentially high rate of return.
Public bonds issued by a company that has been downgraded by a ratings
agency to non-investment grade or "junk" status are a prime example of
distressed debt. 32 Public bonds, however, are not the only type of distressed
debt that trades.33 Banks are increasingly syndicating commercial loans or
selling their loans once a company experiences financial distress. 34 This
29. "'The level of stress or distress can range from companies underperforming relative
to expectations all the way through the default and bankruptcy spectrum to post-
reorganization equities."' Emma Trincal, The Sunny Side of Distressed Debt,
THESTREET.COM, Apr. 3, 2006, http://www.thestreet.com/story/10276903/1/the-sunny-side-
of-distressed-debt.html (quoting Katalin Kutasi of Kellner DiLeo Cohen & Co.).
30. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 99; Hedge Fund Consistency Index,
Distressed Securities, http://www.hedgefund-index.com/SectorDefinitions.asp#Distressed
Securities; see also ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 4 (using this narrow definition to reference
only "defaulted" debt).
31. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 99; Libby Bruch, Standard & Poor's U.S.
Distressed Debt Monthly Monitor: Distressed Debt No Threat for Now, INVESTING IN
BONDS, available at http://www.investinginbonds.com/news.asp?catid=36&id=1387; see
also ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 4 (using this broader definition to reference all "distressed"
debt); Marykay Fuller, The Distressed Debt Market-a Major Force That's Here to Stay,
RECOVERY, Spring 2006, at 15, 15, available at http://www.r3.org.uk/uploads/documents/
spring2006.pdf ("Historically, 'distress' has been defined as debt trading between 80 per
cent and 90 per cent of par value but the European market with its excess liquidity recently
has seen 'distressed' debt trading between 90 per cent and 95 per cent of par.").
32. The U.S. defaulted junk bond market alone has grown to over one trillion dollars in
2006. See EDWARD I. ALTMAN, NYU SALOMON CTR., ABOUT CORPORATE DEFAULT RATES 2
(2007), available at http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-ealtman/AboutCorporateDefaultRates.pdf.
33. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100 (explaining that a distressed debt
investor may purchase "bank debt, corporate debt, trade claims, lease contracts, private
placements, common or preferred stock and/or warrants").
34. See, e.g., ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 3 ("Syndicated lending has risen more than 60
percent in the last three years and rose to total outstandings of $1.5 trillion in 2005.");
Sandeep Dahiya et al., Bank Borrowers and Loan Sales: New Evidence on the Uniqueness
of Bank Loans, 76 J. BUS. 563, 563-64 (2003), available at http://www.joumals.uchicago.
edu/doi/pdf/10. 1086/377031 (explaining the secondary market for syndicated and distressed
loans); Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration of Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk
Bond Markets, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 299, 301-05 (2004) (explaining development of loan
syndication market and noting that "the volume of trading of syndicated loans on the
secondary market rose from $8 billion (of mostly distressed debt) per year in 1991 to $110
billion (of mostly par loans) in 2001"); see also THEODORE M. BARNHILL ET AL., HIGH YIELD
BONDS 40-43, 59-72 (1999) (explaining the leveraged loan market in U.S. and non-U.S.
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practice is a definitive change for banks, which historically maintained
large in-house workout departments to take charge of troubled credits and
work with troubled companies to maximize the bank's return. 35
In addition to bonds and bank loans, the trade debt of troubled U.S.
companies also trades frequently, particularly once the company files for
bankruptcy. 36 Trade debt includes claims against a troubled company held
by the company's suppliers and vendors. These parties generally are
anxious to liquidate their claims and avoid involvement in the bankruptcy
process. 37 This practice is common in the United States because U.S.
bankruptcy law permits such claims trading, and the claims represented by
the trade debt carry a vote on, and potential recovery under, the debtor's
reorganization plan.38
Some distressed debt investors also loan money directly to troubled
companies. 39 These loans carry a high interest rate to compensate the
markets). In 2006, approximately $40 billion in distressed loans traded in the secondary
market. See Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation, U.S. Secondary Loan Market Volume,
http://www.loanpricing.com/analytics/pricing-service-volumel.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2008).
35. See, e.g., Mark Thompson, Recent Developments Involving Distressed Bank Debt, in
XVII BANKING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING LAW, ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIALS 427,
429, 454 (1996); Krasoff & O'Neill, supra note 22 (noting trend among regulated banks to
sell distressed loans quickly); see also John Houghton, A Fresh Approach, LEGAL WK., Sept.
28, 2006, at 28, 28 (noting similar trend in U.K.); Roundtable: The Restructuring Elite
Await Their Next Boom, BANK LOAN REP., Apr. 2, 2007, at 14, 14 ("Most of the banks have
flushed their workout departments as they have increased their syndication departments and
they have, as a matter of conscious risk management, reduced their exposure to the credits
they are syndicating." (interview with Jim Millstein, Lazard Freres & Co.)).
36. Bankruptcy claims trading is big business. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & David
A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 85, 101-02 (1995) (discussing volume of claims trading); Frederick Tung,
Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1684, 1685-89 (1996) ("The size of
the market was estimated to run as high as $300 billion."); see also Andrew Africk, Trading
Claims in Chapter 11: How Much Influence Can Be Purchased in Good Faith Under
Section 1126?, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1393, 1393 (1991): Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers
Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1, 8 (1990); Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of
Negotiability in the Wake ofEnron, 2007 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 83, 86-98.
37. See, e.g., Tung, supra note 36, at 1702 (explaining that suppliers often prefer cash
rather than a debtor's securities, which might be distributed under a plan); see also Marcia
Pledger, Shopping for Ideas: Homeplace Looking for Ways to Improve, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Jan. 17, 1999, at 1-H ("Generally, vendors sell their claims at a substantial
discount because they prefer to get some cash quickly instead of being involved in
bankruptcy proceedings.").
38. Rule 3001(e) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure specifically
contemplates and governs claims trading in U.S. bankruptcy cases. FED. R. BANKR. P.
3001(e).
39. See ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 11 (noting trend of distressed companies turning to
nontraditional lending sources, which now offer rescue financing); see also Kit R. Roane,
Hedging Their Debts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 2006, at 38, 38-39 ("Some hedge
fund companies, like Ritchie Capital Management, have formed new divisions that focus
only on direct lending.").
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investors for the higher risk of default.40 They also include tight financial
and operational covenants and acceleration provisions that give the investor
significant control over the company upon a default. Lenders issuing these
types of distressed loans often are said to be "loaning to own."41 This
phrase refers both to the lender's ability to take over the company, or at
least its assets upon a default, and the tight financial covenants associated
with the loan, which may help facilitate a default.
2. Types of Distressed Debt Investors
Investors in distressed debt typically are institutional investors.42 This
Article uses the phrase "institutional investor" to mean hedge funds, private
equity firms, and banks that have established proprietary trading desks.
Pension funds and mutual funds qualify as institutional investors but,
subject to a few exceptions, are not directly active in the distressed debt
market. 43 Similarly, insurance and leasing companies may invest directly
40. See ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 11 ("These loans are being made at 350-450 bp over
LIBOR in 2006 and in order to hit the funds' target rates of return, leverage of two to three
times the investment is commonly utilized."); see also The Vultures Take Wing, supra note
28, at 78 (noting that, in one "loan-to-own" situation, "[t]he hedge fund charged a credit-
card-like rate of interest.... [and] secured the right for ten years to buy over 3 m[illion
company] shares for $10 each").
41. This phrase also is used to describe the practice of buying distressed debt to acquire
ownership of the company, as discussed further, infra in Part III.B. See Krasoff & O'Neill,
supra note 22, at 19.
42. See, e.g., ALTMAN, supra note 23, at 4 (noting that nonbank institutions now provide
"more than three-quarters of the funds" for highly leveraged syndicated loans); WILLIAM
MAY ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, LOAN ISSUANCE BOOM SHIFTS REFTNANCING RISK STRONGLY TO
LOAN MARKET 5 (2007), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/dtp/pdf3-07/iloa0726.pdf
(noting that nonbank institutions held over 70% of the leveraged loan market in the first
quarter of 2007); see also The Vultures Take Wing, supra note 28, at 77 ("According to
Standard & Poor's ... , non-banks such as hedge funds now make roughly half of all high-
yielding leveraged loans and hold the lion's share of the secondary market."). Certain high-
profile individuals, such as Carl Icahn and Wilbur Ross, have established their own firms to
facilitate distressed debt investments. See Phyllis Berman & Lea Goldman, Let Us Prey,
FORBES, Apr. 2, 2001, at 138.
43. Pension funds and certain other institutional investors often are prohibited under
their charters or applicable regulations from holding below investment grade securities.
Mutual funds, on the other hand, typically can, but choose not to, invest in distressed debt.
See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REv. 561, 580 (2006) ("Hedge funds, like mutual funds, hold pools of assets. Unlike
mutual funds, they engage in a wide variety of investment strategies, including investing in
distressed securities, illiquid securities, securities of companies in emerging markets,
derivatives, and arbitrage opportunities."). Nevertheless, some mutual funds do hold small
distressed investments. See Berman & Goldman, supra note 42, at 140 ("A few [mutual
funds], like Third Avenue Value and Fidelity Capital & Income, have been known to dabble
in defaulted bonds, but only have tiny portions of their portfolios there."); see also Rich
Pickings, FUND STRATEGY, Apr. 3, 2006, at 20, 24 (noting existence of some mutual funds
engaged in distressed debt investing, including in the United Kingdom). In addition, pension
funds may invest indirectly in the distressed market through hedge funds or other distressed
debt funds. See, e.g., EDWARD I. ALTMAN & SHUBIN JHA, NYU SALOMON CTR., MARKET SIZE
AND INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF DEFAULTED BONDS AND BANK LOANS: 1987-2002, at 11
(2003), available at http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-ealtman/MIP-87-02.pdf ("Several domestic
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or indirectly in the distressed debt market. Their activity in that market,
however, is nominal compared to that of hedge funds, private equity firms,
and banks.44 Hedge funds appear to be the most active group in the
distressed debt market, generating approximately "47% of annual [trading]
volume in distressed debt and about one-third of the trading volume in
leveraged loans and one-quarter [in] high-yield bonds" from 2005-2006. 45
B. General Strategies of Distressed Debt Investors
Investors purchase distressed debt at a discount off of its face value,
reflecting the risk associated with the investment.46 Investors generally
realize gain on distressed debt investments when the debt issuer achieves,
or the market anticipates, a successful turnaround. 47 For example, an
investor who purchases a company's distressed debt for 50% of par makes a
100% profit on the investment if the company ultimately repays the debt in
full.
pension funds and foreign portfolios have effectively used this strategy by allocating a
portion of their total investments to defaulted debt money managers."); Africk, supra note
36, at 1393 ("Pension funds and other institutional investors have contributed more than $3
billion to 'vulture' or 'debt raider' funds, which buy strategic blocks of debt issued by
companies facing bankruptcy."); see also William J. Crerend, Institutional Investment in
Hedge Funds, in HEDGE FUNDS: INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES FOR THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 21, 21-23 (Jess Lederman & Robert A. Klein eds., 1995)
(explaining general investment practices of pension funds with respect to hedge funds);
Berman & Goldman, supra note 42, at 140.
44. In fact, these institutional investors often are among the original par investors in an
issuance who later sell to distressed debt investors when the issuer experiences financial
distress. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Some Realism About Reorganization: Explaining the
Failure of Chapter 11 Theory, 106 DICK. L. REV. 267, 301 (2001) ("As the issuing firm's
prospects fade, and the firm becomes a 'fallen angel,' the original institutional holders will
sell their debentures to the distressed securities arms of major investment banks, and other
'vulture' investors.").
45. Aaron Siegel, Hedge Funds Turn Up the Volume, INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 14, 2006,
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060914/REG/609140707/10
94/rNDailyO3&ht=; see also Michael Murphy, A Transition Year for the Middle Market
Distressed Debt Arena, HIGH YIELD REP., Mar. 13, 2006, at 3, 3 ("Hedge funds are estimated
to hold over 80% of the middle market second liens ...."); Press Release, Greenwich
Assocs., U.S. Fixed Income Trading Volumes Climb (Sept. 14, 2006) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review). A similar trend exists in Europe. See Gillian Tett, Who Owns Your
Loan? Why Europe's Businesses Face Surprise when Trouble Hits, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 29, 2005, at 15 ("[Hedge funds] now represent 35 per cent of the [primary leveraged
European loan] market. And when secondary loan trading is considered, the proportion can
be much higher at distressed companies.").
46. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100; see also GILSON, supra note 22, at 198
("After publicly traded bonds go into default, they typically trade at about 30 percent of their
face value; the average discount for more-junior bonds is even larger."). For example,
before their restructurings, Kmart Corp.'s and Schefenacker plc's bonds traded at
approximately 20% of face value. See Here to Stay, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2007, at 24, 24
(discussing Schefenacker); Joann Muller, A Fix-Up on Fast Forward, BUS. WK., Oct. 14,
2002, at 101, 101-02 (discussing Kmart). Before the Jarvis restructuring, its bank debt was
trading around 70% and then dropped to between 45-50%, of face value. See Jarvis
Plummets After Bank Meeting, LOAN MARKET WK., May 2, 2005, at 2.
47. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100.
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Not all distressed debt investors seek to realize gain by holding the debt
until maturity or redemption. Different investors use different strategies to
realize their target rate of return on distressed debt.48 A typical distressed
debt investment strategy is selling the debt for a profit shortly after its
purchase, but before maturity or redemption. 49 Investors invoking this
practice are akin to traders, flipping the debt quickly to realize gain
resulting from small movements in the market. 50 These investors typically
have short-term investment horizons (less than one year). 51
Investors with long-term investment horizons (more than one year)
generally seek to realize gain through one of two key strategies. 52 First,
investors may purchase distressed debt and hold the debt until payment at
maturity or redemption.53 Second, an investor may purchase distressed
debt to try to acquire equity in the company through a debt-for-equity
exchange as part of the company's financial restructuring. 54 The investor
then realizes gain on the investment by liquidating its equity position at a
later date.
Investors with long-term investment horizons also may invest in a
company's distressed debt to acquire control of the company. 55  This
48. Distressed debt investors also may invest in both the debt and equity of the
distressed company. "Distressed arbitrage" is a form of combination investing that
"involves purchasing publicly traded bonds of bankrupt companies and selling their common
stock short." Donna Klinger, Here Be Dragons, NACUBO Bus. OFFICER, Apr. 2002, at 33,
33. For a general description of hedge fund investment strategies, see generally HEDGE
FUNDS: INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO STRATEGIES FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra
note 43.
49. See, e.g., ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D; LHABITANT, supra note
22, at 100; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29-30; see also Simon Granger, Understanding
the Distressed Investor, RECOVERY, Spring 2006, at 20, 20, available at http://www.r3.org.
uk/uploads/documents/spring2006.pdf (explaining the strategy of "trad[ing] the debt.., at a
higher price within a short time frame").
50. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29 ("[These investors], also known as
speculators and traders, are the traditional type of vultures who dart in and out of securities
looking for a good trade.").
51. See ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D (describing "[hiolding period
of 6 months to [one] year").
52. See, e.g., id.; LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29-
33.
53. See ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D (referring to these types of
investors generally as "Active/Non-Control" and noting that they typically hold debt for one
to two years); LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100-01; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29-33.
54. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29-33; see also DEBTWIRE, NORTH AMERICAN
DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2008, at 16 (2008) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2008] (reporting that, "[w]hile
hedge funds expressed the least interest in loan-to-own, they were the most comfortable with
swapping debt for minority equity stake"); DEBTWIRE, NORTH AMERICAN DISTRESSED DEBT
MARKET OUTLOOK 2007, at 20 (2007) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter
DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2007] (reporting that over 40% of survey respondents
indicated that they do not "seek equity control via a 'loan to own' strategy," but "are
interested in acquiring non-control positions via debt-for-equity swaps").
55. See ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D (referring to these types of
investors generally as "Active/Control" and noting that they typically exit the investment
after two to three years); LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100; ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at
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Article uses the term "control" in this context to mean the ability to
influence board or management decisions at the company as either a
debtholder or a shareholder after a debt-for-equity exchange.5 6 The object
of this control typically is to enhance or create value at the company. It is
this new or additional value that allows the investor to realize a meaningful
gain on its investment. 57
Historically, value-creation investing was pursued primarily by private
equity firms. Hedge and other distressed funds, however, are now invoking
this strategy.58 These investors seek to purchase a controlling position in
the company's distressed debt (typically 34%)-either alone or with other
like-minded investors-and then to use this control to help the company
turn around its financial situation.59 Whether this strategy actually adds
long term sustaining value to the company, or is otherwise in the company's
best interests, is subject to considerable debate. 60 Part III addresses this
debate.
Regardless of strategy, distressed debt investors must understand the
bankruptcy laws applicable to the debt issuer. Even if the investor has a
short term investment horizon or the company is attempting an out-of-court
29 ("As restructuring proceeds, [the debtholders] negotiate a plan of reorganization that casts
them in a leading role. These vultures then run the company themselves or bring in
experienced management."); Granger, supra note 49, at 20 (explaining strategy of
"control[ling] the debt and ultimately tak[ing] the equity upside in a business, through either
a consensual or non-consensual route").
56. In addition, investors may hold and try to use a company's debt and equity to
influence affairs prior to any restructuring or exchange. For example, distressed debt
investor Third Point LLC held both the equity and debt of Salton, Inc. When Third Point
was unable to influence corporate affairs to its satisfaction as an equity holder, it warned the
company that it would seek to do so as a debtholder. Salton Inc., Amended Statement of
Beneficial Ownership (Sched. 13D/A), exhibit 1 (Apr. 27, 2005) (explaining, in a letter from
Third Point to Salton's CEO, that "[i]n the likely event that an out of court restructuring is
not reached, I look forward to personally dedicating my considerable energy to serving on
the creditors committee and seeking your outster at that time").
57. See, e.g., LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100 (explaining strategy of activist investor
to realize value); ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 29 (explaining that these investors "throw
their fate in with a company for the long term, staying with it after it has climbed out of the
depths"); see also William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1418-20 (2007) (providing empirical evidence on hedge fund shareholder activism
and noting that "[h]edge fund activism, by its own terms, is about shareholder value
creation").
58. See, e.g., Igino Beverini & Bruno Cova, How Hedge Funds Are Changing
Distressed Debt, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 2006, at 12 (explaining convergence in activities
between hedge funds and private equity funds); Matthew Judd, Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Converge, INT'L FtN. L. REv., Jan. 2006 supp., at 14 (explaining that "[s]ome have
described hedge funds as value finders and private equity funds as value creators" and
exploring the trend of hedge funds doing both); see also Gemma Westacott, Private Equity
Funds Bristle as Hedge Funds Muscle In, LAWYER (U.K.), Feb. 13, 2006, at 13, 13; Duncan
Kerr, Private Equity and Hedge Funds Slug It Out, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 26, 2007,
http://www.efinancialnews.com/usedition/index/content/1047285236.
59. See, e.g., ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D (noting that
"Active/Control" investors generally need to acquire at least one-third of the target
company's distressed debt).
60. See infra Part III.B.3.
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restructuring, bankruptcy law sets the stage for the restructuring
negotiations and drives how the market values the distressed debt. The case
studies in Part II highlight the importance of a given country's bankruptcy
laws.61 Part III then provides an overview of U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy
laws and explores opportunities for investor control under those laws. 62
II. CASE STUDIES OF ACTIVIST DISTRESSED DEBT INVESTING
The foregoing explanation tells just part of the story. Only the actual
practices of distressed debt investors and examples of activist distressed
debt investing can complete the picture. This Article references a survey
administered to potential distressed debt investors to flesh out these
investors' practices and objectives. The results of this survey are fully
detailed in a separate article and used throughout the analysis in Part 111.63
This Article also relies on the reported results of troubled company
restructurings in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The level of reported debtholder activism tracks the level of activity in
the distressed debt market. 64  Consequently, few examples of activist
distressed debt investing exist before the late 1980s. 65 Since that time, deal
activity peaked in the early 1990s, and then again in the early 2000s.66 The
four case studies below represent examples of activist distressed debt
investing in both the United States and the United Kingdom.
A. Allied Holdings, Inc.
The restructuring of Allied Holdings, Inc. is a prime example of how
institutional investors are using distressed debt and the Chapter 11 process
to influence the affairs of troubled companies. Yucaipa purchased
approximately 66% of Allied's unsecured notes, which essentially gave
Yucaipa control of Allied's plan of reorganization process. 67 Yucaipa used
this control not only to facilitate a debt-for-equity exchange in which it
acquired a majority of Allied's new common stock, but also to negotiate a
new secured financing agreement and modified labor contract for Allied.68
61. See infra Part 1i.
62. See infra Part 1II.
63. See generally Hamer, supra note 8.
64. See supra Part I.A.
65. See ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 7-24.
66. See id.
67. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 20-21 (stating that Yucaipa holds
$98.8 million of the $150 million in outstanding unsecured notes). Thus, Yucaipa held
approximately 50% of all of Allied's unsecured debt. See id. at 7, 20-21, 40 (estimating
$196.9 million in total general unsecured claims and explaining that the stock of reorganized
Allied would be distributed on a pro rata basis to the holders of allowed general unsecured
claims).
68. Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 1.01 (June 4, 2007);
Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 2.03 (May 31, 2007); Allied
Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (May 24, 2007).
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Allied also is noteworthy because it demonstrates the strategic value of
distressed debt investments. Allied basically was a repeat play for Yucaipa,
which also acquired the second largest vehicle transporter-Performance
Transportation Services, Inc.--out of bankruptcy in January of 2007.69
These two transactions gave Yucaipa control of over 50% of the U.S.
vehicle transportation market.70
The story of Allied's financial troubles is fairly typical. Allied began
experiencing liquidity problems with a decline in the new car market, rising
fuel costs, and increased labor expenses. 71 It tried to address its liquidity
issues by streamlining operations and implementing workforce reductions.
These changes, however, simply were not enough. Allied needed to
restructure its balance sheet and renegotiate its labor contract. Allied turned
to Chapter 11. 72
In its Chapter 11 case, Allied secured debtor-in-possession financing and
tried to reach a new agreement with its union, the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters. Allied's negotiations with the Teamsters stalled, and it filed
a motion with the bankruptcy court to implement emergency modifications
to its labor contract. 73 The bankruptcy court granted this emergency motion
in May 2006, and the Teamsters began considering responsive options,
including a strike. 74 This stalemate between Allied and the Teamsters
proved to be a golden opportunity for Yucaipa.
Yucaipa purchased $98.8 million of Allied's unsecured notes
approximately one year after Allied's Chapter 11 filing and shortly after
tensions between Allied and the Teamsters peaked.75 Yucaipa first worked
with Allied and the Teamsters to try to reach a consensual deal. 76 When
Allied made the decision to seek bankruptcy court approval to terminate its
labor contract, Yucaipa pursued a different path. Yucaipa entered into
direct negotiations with the Teamsters, reaching an agreement that included
69. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that Yucaipa holds a
majority ownership position in Performance Transportation Services); see also Performance
Transportation Services, Inc. Emerges from Chapter 11, AUTOMOTIVE.COM, Jan. 29, 2007,
http://www.automotive.com/auto-news/02/26054/index.html.
70. See Emshwiller, supra note 6 ("Allied and Performance together account for an
estimated 50% of the new vehicles hauled by truck in the U.S."); Thomas L. Gallagher,
Yucaipa to Acquire Allied, TRAFFIC WORLD, Mar. 5, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
4237546 (noting that, after the Allied acquisition, Yucaipa "would control more than 60%
of the U.S. new-car hauling market"); Allied Holdings to Be Taken over by Yucaipa Cos.,
TRANSPORT Topics ONLINE, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.ttnews.com/articles/basetemplate.
aspx?storyid=17090 (noting that Yucaipa "would control 60% to 70% of the U.S. new-car
hauling market").
71. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 21-23.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 34-35.
74. In re Allied Holdings, Inc., No. 05-12515, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 2,
2006) (Docket No. 1461).
75. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 21.
76. Id. at 34-35; see also Emshwiller, supra note 6 (explaining that Allied first "allowed
Yucaipa to assist the company in talks seeking contract concessions from the Teamsters" and
then "Yucaipa began negotiating with the Teamsters on its own").
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a 15% wage cut. 77 Yucaipa and the Teamsters then made a joint proposal
to Allied regarding a proposed plan of reorganization. 78
Yucaipa's and Allied's divergence in approach with respect to the
Teamsters did not go unnoticed. In fact, some shareholders asserted that
Yucaipa and the Teamsters conspired to reach a deal adverse to the
company and its shareholders. Hawk Opportunity Fund, L.P. and IRA FBO
Mark F. Zimmer filed a federal class action lawsuit against Yucaipa and
others under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.79
The Rutland family, which founded Allied and continued as officers and
shareholders of the company, made similar allegations in their objection to
the joint plan of reorganization ultimately proposed by Allied, Yucaipa, and
the Teamsters.80 The bankruptcy court overruled the Rutland family's
objection to Allied's plan.81 The federal lawsuit mentioned above was
dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff shareholders.8 2
Despite some resistance by shareholders and even the company itself,
Yucaipa now holds a majority ownership interest in the reorganized Allied
Systems Holding, Inc.8 3 Allied's plan of reorganization was sponsored by
Allied, Yucaipa, and the Teamsters and supported by Allied's unsecured
creditors' committee. Yucaipa's influence over the plan's ultimate terms,
however, is undeniable. The plan provided for an exchange of Allied's
unsecured debt for equity in. the reorganized company and gives Yucaipa
substantial control rights over the company's affairs. For example, Yucaipa
can appoint four of the company's five board members, including the
company's CEO, and has the discretion to direct a sale of the company's
Canadian assets. 84 Yucaipa also was instrumental in securing $315 million
in postbankruptcy financing for Allied. 85
77. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 34-35; see also Emshwiller, supra note
6 ("The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which represents about 3,300 Allied
workers in the U.S., agreed to back a 15% wage cut for those workers."); Allied Holdings to
Be Taken over by Yucaipa Cos., supra note 70 ("Allied ... approved the deal in spite of a
15% wage cut.").
78. See Press Release, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Allied Management Asks for
More Time to Review Yucaipa Plan (Feb. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.teamster.org/press-release.aspx?id=7670&terms=allied+management+asks+for+
more+time* (noting that Allied's management requested more time to review plan of
reorganization incorporating terms agreed to by Yucaipa and Teamsters).
79. Complaint-Class Action at 1-2, Hawk Opportunity Fund, L.P. v. Yucaipa Am.
Alliance Fund I, L.P., No. 1:07-CV-0907 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2007).
80. Objection of the Rutland Family to Confirmation of the Joint Plan of Reorganization
of Allied Holdings, Inc. and Affiliated Debtors Proposed by the Debtors, Yucaipa and the
Teamsters National Automobile Transportation Industry Negotiating Committee, In re
Allied Holdings, Inc., No. 05-12515 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2007) (Docket No. 2958).
81. Allied, No. 05-12515, slip op. at 23, 27, 28 (May 18, 2007) (Docket No. 3113)
(confirming plan of reorganization and overruling objections to plan).
82. Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice, Hawk, No. 1:07-CV-0907 (May 18, 2007)
(Docket No. 3).
83. Allied Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 5.01 (June 4, 2007).
84. Allied Disclosure Statement, supra note 1, at 18, 49.
85. Id. at 45 (noting that Yucaipa played a "key role" in obtaining exit financing); Allied
Sys. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 2.03 (May 31, 2007).
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B. Schefenackerplc
Similar to Allied, Schefenacker plc began as a family-owned company in
the automotive sector. It commenced business in 1935 and was
headquartered in Germany. 86 Schefenacker produces approximately one-
third of the vehicle rear-view mirrors sold throughout the world.8 7
Schefenacker's fortunes deteriorated after acquiring the business of one
of its competitors in 2000.88 The debt incurred to finance the acquisition
weighed heavily on Schefenacker's balance sheet. In 2004, Schefenacker
tried to address its financial difficulties through a refinancing of its senior
secured bank debt. Schefenacker's German banks, apparently weary of the
situation, seized the refinancing as an opportunity to sell their holdings of
€250 million to foreign entities, primarily London-based hedge funds and
other institutions.89
The new holders of Schefenacker's bank debt took an active role in the
company's ongoing restructuring efforts. Schefenacker implemented major
corporate changes at the behest of the debtholders. Most notably,
Schefenacker moved its corporate headquarters from Germany to
England.90 The holders reportedly viewed England as a friendlier forum for
Schefenacker's restructuring efforts. 91 Schefenacker also appointed a chief
restructuring officer.92 Simultaneously, Schefenacker's CEO and CFO
were dismissed, and the bank debtholders retained the right to appoint a
new CEO.
93
These corporate governance changes were part of an overall financial
restructuring negotiated between the company, its bank debtholders, and its
86. See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15.
87. See Verified Petition for Order, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1507, 1517, 1520,
and 1521, Recognizing Company Voluntary Arrangement as Foreign Main Proceeding,
Enforcing Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United States, and Granting Other
Appropriate Relief, exhibit A-i, at 21, In re Schefenacker plc, No. 07-11482 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2007) (Docket No. 2) [hereinafter Schefenacker CVA] (Company
Voluntary Arrangement, dated Mar. 9, 2007, included as exhibit A-I to the Verified Petition
for Order); Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15.
88. See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15; see also Schefenacker CVA, supra note 87, at
22-25 (explaining financial issues leading to restructuring).
89. See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15 ("German banks sold off most of their
Schefenacker loans to UK hedge funds and institutions, so more than 90[%] of creditors are
now based in London."); Kevin Reed, German Business Avoids Insolvency in UK Move,
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/
2168185/german-business-ducks (same); see also Oliver Wihofszki, Hedge Funds to Hold
Majority in Schefenacker, FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, Feb. 12, 2007, available at LEXIS,
Europe Intelligence Wire File (abstract) (same and noting that "in the last few months
Schefenacker has had two new CEOs").
90. See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15; Colin Whitbread, Schefenacker Transfers
Operating Subsidiaries to the U.K., WORLD MARKETS RESEARCH CENTRE, Nov. 3, 2006 (on
file with the Fordham Law Review).
91. See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 15.
92. Schefenacker CVA, supra note 87, at 23.
93. Id. at 23, 29-30.
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majority shareholder, Dr. Alfred Schefenacker. 94 The company's major
customers also participated in the negotiations. 95 The restructuring plan
contemplated a debt-for-equity exchange that provided the bank debtholders
with a controlling ownership position in the company. Dr. Schefenacker
retained approximately 20% of the company's equity under the plan, and
approximately 5% of the equity was earmarked for the holders of
Schefenacker's unsecured bonds.96 The plan also included a new financing
package for the company underwritten by Deutsche Bank A.G. Both Dr.
Schefenacker and the bank debtholders committed to subscribe to part of
the financing package. 97
Schefenacker's unsecured bond holders were on the periphery of the
restructuring negotiations. At the time, the unsecured bonds were trading at
approximately 20% of face value. 98  Most of the leverage in the
restructuring negotiations rested with the bank debtholders. Accordingly,
the financial restructuring plan proposed to exchange the €200 million of
unsecured bond claims for 5% of the company's equity and E7.5 million in
cash and warrants to acquire additional equity.99
Schefenacker proposed to compromise its unsecured bond claims through
a company voluntary arrangement (CVA). 100 The bank debtholders,
however, did not hide their intentions to pursue the restructuring plan
through an enforcement sale if bondholders failed to approve the CVA. 10 1
After two modifications to the CVA, the bondholders approved the CVA on
May 2, 2007. The CVA's implementation is subject to the satisfaction of
certain conditions precedent, including the recognition and enforcement of
the CVA under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.10 2
94. Id. at 25 ("Intensive negotiations were conducted among the representatives of the
Term Lenders, the representatives of the OEMs and representatives of Dr. Schefenacker in
order to determine whether agreement could be reached on the provision of further funding
and terms for a financial restructuring ... .
95. See id. at 25, 43.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 28-29.
98. See Here to Stay, supra note 46, at 24.
99. See Verified Petition for Order, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 1507, 1517, 1520,
and 1521, Recognizing Company Voluntary Arrangement as Foreign Main Proceeding,
Enforcing Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United States, and Granting Other
Appropriate Relief at 2, 8-9, In re Schefenacker plc, No. 07-11482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May
15, 2007) (Docket No. 2) [hereinafter Schefenacker Verified Petition].
100. Id. at 2-3, 7-9.
101. Schefenacker CVA, supra note 87, at 31-34.
102. Schefenacker Verified Petition, supra note 99, at 7-9; see also Schefenacker, No.
07-11482, slip op. (June 14, 2007) (order recognizing proceeding relating to Schefenacker
CVA as a foreign main proceeding, issuing injunction, and closing case). A group of
Schefenacker's bondholders objected to the Verified Petition, alleging that Schefenacker
failed to provide full disclosure of information relevant to the restructuring and that
Germany, not England, is Schefenacker's center of main interest. See Bondholder Group
Objection to Chapter 15 Petition at 1-3, Schefenacker, No. 07-11482 (June 11, 2007)
(Docket No. 40) [hereinafter Schefenacker Bondholder Objection]. These bondholders
appealed the Schefenacker Approval Order, but subsequently withdrew the notice of appeal.
See Notice of Appeal, Schefenacker, No. 07-11482 (June 25, 2007) (Docket No. 88); Notice
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C. Jarvis plc
Jarvis plc is a U.K. engineering services company that encountered
financial difficulties in 2004.103 The company embarked on an aggressive
growth strategy between 1997 and 2003, "result[ing] in revenue growth to
£1.1 billion in 2003, from £261 million six years earlier-an average of
27% a year."' 0 4 This rapid growth, however, masked operational and
financial weaknesses that eventually were revealed following a tragic train
accident and subsequent investigation into Jarvis's affairs in 2002.105 By
2004, the company faced a severe liquidity crisis. 10 6 New business and the
resulting cash flows were drying up, and existing management could not
agree on a rescue plan.
Jarvis's most pressing issue was its £310 million of institutional debt,
which was in default. 10 7 Jarvis's banks, primarily Barclays and Royal Bank
of Scotland, were willing to assist Jarvis with its restructuring efforts, but
they kept Jarvis on a very short leash. The banks granted Jarvis extensions
of its facilities and additional capital in small increments that were based on
the company's progress in its restructuring efforts.10 8 Jarvis in turn worked
closely with the banks to design and implement a viable turnaround plan.
The banks had a say in major restructuring decisions, including the
appointment of Alan Lovell as Jarvis's new CEO in late 2004.109
A key component of Jarvis's turnaround plan involved the restructuring
of its business operations. This restructuring included the sale of Jarvis's
London tube line operations and certain noncore assets. 1t 0 It also involved
of Withdrawal of Appeal, In re Schefenacker plc, No. 07-cv-06598-SAS (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2007) (Docket No. 5).
103. See Eric A. Simonsen & Brian Cassady, From 'Off-the-Rails' to 'Back-on-Track':
The Collapse and Rescue ofJarvis PLC, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2007, at 113, 114-15.
104. Id. at 113.
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id. at 114-15.
107. See id. at 115 (explaining that, in mid-2004, "Jarvis had £4 million of cash, £132
million of trade payables averaging more than 60 days past due, and was in default on all of
its £310 million of institutional debt"); see also JARVIS PLC, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS
2004, at 18-19, 26-27, available at http://www.jarvis-uk.com/jarvisplc/investor/reports/
ar04/arO4.pdf; Richard Wray, Jarvis Seeking Extra £20 Million Loan, THE GUARDIAN
(London), May 7, 2005, at 26.
108. See Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 117 (explaining banks' demands for
time and additional liquidity Jarvis needed to accomplish restructuring); see also JARVIS PLC,
PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH
2005, at 11-12 (2005) [hereinafter JARVIS UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR 2005], available at
http://www.jarvis-uk.com/jarvisplc/tools/pdfs/p.announcement.pdf (providing timeline of
key events in restructuring).
109. See, e.g., John Waples, Lovell Fights to Keep Jarvis on the Rails, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Dec. 12, 2004, at 10 ("[Lovell] was encouraged to take the post by Royal Bank of
Scotland, one of the lead creditors at Jarvis and a former lender to both Costain and Dunlop
Slazenger.").
110. See Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 120; Press Release, Jarvis plc, Jarvis
PLC Statement Re Transactions (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Statement Re Transactions],
available at http://www.jarvis-uk.com/jarvisplc/investor/news/msitem?id=l 107154853nRN
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finding an exit strategy for Jarvis with respect to fourteen open private
finance construction projects."I ' The latter task proved challenging because
of the number of parties involved in the projects and the complexity of the
deal structures. Ultimately, Jarvis reached a global settlement on the
construction projects under which it capped its total liability, received a
release from its guaranty obligations, and agreed to make a cash
contribution to the completion of the projects.' 1 2
The other key aspect of Jarvis's turnaround plan was the restructuring of
its balance sheet. Jarvis needed to restructure its long-term debt
obligations, which presented an opportunity for distressed debt investors.
In early 2005, Barclays and Royal Bank of Scotland sold Jarvis's debt to
ten U.S. hedge funds, including Canyon Capital and Strategic Value
Partners."13 Deutsche Bank AG also invested in Jarvis's debt and took the
lead in restructuring negotiations with the company. 114  At the time,
observers speculated that these investors purchased the debt "with the point
of forcing a debt-for-equity swap at a later date."1 15 In fact, this is precisely
what happened.
Negotiations between Jarvis and its debtholders resulted in a new
financial package for the company and majority ownership of the company
for the debtholders. Under the package, debtholders would receive
approximately 95% of the company's equity in exchange for approximately
£378 million in debt. 116 The exchange would reduce the company's net
indebtedness to less than £20 million and dilute the holdings of existing
shareholders to less than 5%.117 The package also contemplated "a placing
and open offer, conditionally underwritten by Deutsche Bank, to raise
approximately £50 [million] of new money."'118
Jarvis needed to obtain existing shareholder approval in order to
implement the proposed debt-for-equity exchange. Accordingly, in July
2005, Jarvis distributed a restructuring circular to its shareholders
explaining the terms of the exchange and the results of the operational
Se9698H (explaining terms of sale of tube line operations); see also JARVIS UNAUDITED
RESULTS FOR 2005, supra note 108, at 11.
111. See Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 117.
112. See id. at 120; Statement Re Transactions, supra note 110 (explaining terms of
settlement); see also JARVIS UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR 2005, supra note 108, at 11-12.
113. See Jarvis Takes Battering as US Sharks Circle, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), Apr. 19,
2005, at 17, available at LEXIS, Birmingham Post File; Lucy Smy, Jarvis Reveals Details of
£350m Debt Swap, FIN. TIMES (London), July 13, 2005, at 24.
114. See Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 121.
115. Baird, supra note 15.
116. See, e.g., Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 121; Hugh Tomlinson, Back from
the Brink: Alasdair Marnoch at Jarvis, FIN. WK. (U.K.), May 23, 2006,
http://www.financeweek.co.uk/iten/3677; Turnaround for Jarvis, DAILY MAIL (London),
Dec. 1, 2005, at 79, available at LEXIS, Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (London) File.
117. See Simonsen & Cassady, supra note 103, at 120-21; see also Michael Harrison,
Shareholders Wiped Out in Jarvis Debt Restructuring, INDEPENDENT (London), May 24,
2005, at 58.
118. See JARVIS UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR 2005, supra note 108, at 1, 12.
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restructuring."l 9 Shareholders then voted in favor of the exchange at an
extraordinary general meeting in late 2005.120 Although the exchange
substantially diluted the existing shareholders' equity position, it apparently
was viewed as a more favorable result for the company than delisting or
filing bankruptcy.
D. Kmart Corporation
On January 22, 2002, Kmart Corporation and thirty-seven of its U.S.
subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Illinois.121 A flawed expansion plan in the
1980s and intense competition from retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target
played a major role in Kmart's financial demise. 122 In addition, creditors
and shareholders attributed blame to Kmart's management team, alleging
gross mismanagement and corporate waste.123 Ultimately, the shareholder
claims against management were dismissed or settled. 124 Nonetheless, the
government's investigations into the conduct of Kmart's former CEO and
CFO are ongoing. 125
Most observers believed that Kmart's bankruptcy marked the beginning
of the end for the 103-year-old retail giant. At least one distressed debt
investor, however, saw things differently. ESL Investments, Inc. (ESL)-
the hedge fund established by Edward Lampert and headquartered in
Greenwich, Connecticut-saw Kmart's situation as an opportunity for
change and profit.
Shortly after Kmart's bankruptcy, ESL began purchasing Kmart's
prepetition bank, bond, and trade debt. ESL ultimately acquired $382
million in principal amount of bank debt, $1.177 billion in principal amount
of bond debt, and $61 million of trade debt.' 26 These investments resulted
in ESL holding approximately 35% of the bank debt, 51% of the bond debt,
119. Id. at 12.
120. See Press Release, Jarvis plc, Jarvis PLC Completion of Restructuring (Sept. 29,
2005) [hereinafter Completion of Restructuring], available at http://www.jarvis-uk.com/
jarvisplc/investor/news/rnsitem?id= 1128009524nRNSc9827R (announcing completion of
restructuring and noting that shareholders approved restructuring plan on August 4, 2005).
121. See, e.g., Kmart Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 9 (Dec. 23, 2002).
122. See, e.g., Kmart Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 5 (Mar. 24, 2003).
123. See, e.g., Kmart Creditor Trust v. Conaway, 307 B.R. 586, 590 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2004); John Kostrzewa, Arbitration Panel Clears Former Kmart Executive, PROVIDENCE J.
(R.I.), Aug. 21, 2005, at F2; Kathleen Kerwin, Creditors Take on Kmart's "Frat Boys,"
Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 2003, http://www.businessweek.comibwdaily/dnflash/nov2003/nf2003
1121_5491 db035.htm.
124. See, e.g., Kostrzewa, supra note 123 (reporting exoneration of Kmart CEO from
charges of mismanagement by a three-member arbitration panel).
125. See SEC v. Conaway, No. 05-40263, 2006 WL 2828569, at *1, 8 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
29, 2006) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
126. Disclosure Statement with Respect to First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of
Kmart Corporation and Its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession at 74, In re Kmart
Corp., No. 02-02474 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003) (Docket No. 8894) [hereinafter Kmart
Disclosure Statement].
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and 25% of Kmart's estimated total prepetition debt of $6,009,184,238.127
In addition, ESL worked with another investment fund-Third Avenue
Trust (Third Avenue)-that owned $99 million in principal amount of bond
debt and $79 million of trade debt.128 ESL and Third Avenue were Kmart's
largest creditors and together controlled Kmart's restructuring process.129
On September 11, 2002, approximately eight months after Kmart's
bankruptcy filing, ESL and Third Avenue were appointed to a statutory
committee of bank and bond creditors in Kmart's Chapter 11 case, referred
to as the Financial Institutions' Committee. 130 As committee members,
ESL and Third Avenue had access to Kmart's business plan, financial
statements, and other information relating to Kmart's restructuring efforts.
They also had a seat at the negotiating table. By October 2002, Kmart's
CEO, James Adamson, was quoted as saying that ESL and Third Avenue
had "refocused" the company and that they were pushing for a quick exit
from Chapter 11-a strategy with which Adamson did not necessarily
agree.131
ESL and Third Avenue prevailed. By the end of January 2003, Kmart
had appointed a new CEO, entered into an Investment Agreement with ESL
and Third Avenue, and filed its disclosure statement and related plan of
reorganization with the SEC and the bankruptcy court. 132 ESL also took a
"hands-on" approach to Kmart's business plan and proposed the
postbankruptcy board of directors and management team. 133 Kmart's plan
of reorganization terminated the current board of directors and gave ESL
and Third Avenue the right to appoint four of the nine directors on the new,
postbankruptcy board. 134 Edward ultimately was appointed as Kmart's
chairman of the board.135
Under Kmart's plan of reorganization, ESL and Third Avenue received
approximately 50% of the company's new common stock. 136 In exchange
for this stock, the investors agreed to cancel their debt claims against the
company and invest approximately $140 million in the reorganized
127. Id. at x-xvii, 54, 74.
128. Id. at 74.
129. Id. at vii, 74-77.
130. Id. at 18. The law firm Jones Day represented the Financial Institutions' Committee.
I was a lawyer at Jones Day at the time, but I did not work on the engagement. My husband
also was a lawyer at Jones Day at the time and did actively work on the engagement.
Nonetheless, my knowledge of, and all information in this Article regarding, the Kmart cases
is based on the publicly available sources cited herein.
131. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 46.
132. Kmart Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), item 5 (Jan. 28, 2003).
133. Kmart Disclosure Statement, supra note 126, at 94, app. A, at A-15.
134. Id.
135. Kmart Holding Corp., Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Sched. 13D), at 11 (May
15, 2003).
136. See Kmart Holding Corp., Statement of Ownership (Sched. 13G), item 4 (Mar. 10,
2004); Kmart Holding Corp., Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Sched. 13D), at 2, 15
(May 15, 2003).
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company. 137 ESL also received the right to purchase additional new
common stock for a period of two years and agreed to invest up to an
additional $60 million in the form of a note, at the company's election. 138
Kmart's common stock soared in value from $15 per share to $109 per
share after the company's emergence from bankruptcy. 139  ESL and
Lampert continued to play an active role in Kmart's business and
management postbankruptcy. They streamlined Kmart's business
operations and orchestrated its merger with Sears Roebuck & Co. in
2005.140 Lampert continues to serve as Chairman of the Board, and ESL
and its affiliates continue to own approximately 42.5% of the merged
company. 14 1 The merged company is facing some challenging issues. 142
Nevertheless, Kmart's immediate postbankruptcy performance increased its
stock value and resulting return to certain prepetition creditors by 543%
over an 18-month holding period.14 3
III. RESTRUCTURING TRENDS AND ACTIVIST DISTRESSED DEBT INVESTING
The case studies of Allied, Schefenacker, Jarvis, and Kmart demonstrate
that debtholders in both the United States and the United Kingdom can
influence far more than the terms of a company's financial contracts. They
can influence management decisions, personnel changes, and the capital
structure of a company. But exactly how are debtholders accomplishing
these feats? What are the consequences for the debt issuer, its management,
and its shareholders? What is the resulting effect, if any, on restructuring
processes in the United States and the United Kingdom? This Article
analyzes these and other related issues below.
A. Distressed Debt as an Activist Tool
A company needs cash to survive. This basic fact provides a world of
opportunity for the distressed debt investor. A troubled company may ask
its debtholders to, among other things, provide additional capital, waive
loan defaults, forbear from exercising remedies, or compromise the debt.
Each of these requests presents the debtholders with an opportunity to
influence corporate affairs, and perhaps, even to seize control of the
company.
137. Kmart Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 4.1, at 8 (Jan. 28, 2003)
(Investment Agreement).
138. Kmart Holding Corp., Statement of Beneficial Ownership (Sched. 13D), at 12 (May
15, 2003).
139. Yuval Rosenberg, The Man Behind the Deal, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 17, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2004/11/17/news/newsmakers/lampert/index.htm.
140. See Sears Holdings Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2, 4-5 (Mar. 28, 2007).
141. Id. at 9.
142. See, e.g., Sears Holdings Profit Drops; Stock Tumbles, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 30,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/30/news/companies/sears/index.htm.
143. David M. Berkowitz, Kmart: A Case for the Bankruptcy History Books?,
HEDGEFUND J., Jan. 2006, available at http://www.thehedgefundjoumal.com/commentary/
index.php?articleid=22794666.
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The extent of a debtholder's influence depends largely on three factors:
the characteristics of its debt holdings, its statutory rights, and its
contractual rights. Debt characteristics refers to the amount and type of
debt held by the debtholder. For example, a debtholder holding senior
secured debt generally is in a stronger negotiating position than one holding
subordinated unsecured debt.14 4  A debtholder's position is enhanced
further if it holds a controlling (i.e., more than 34%) or majority (i.e., more
than 50%) stake in the debt. 145 A controlling or majority debtholder often
uses its statutory and contractual rights as leverage in its negotiations with
the company.
Allied, Schefenacker, Jarvis, and Kmart demonstrate the importance of
these three factors. In each case, debtholders purchased a controlling stake
in a tranche of debt subject to compromise in the company's restructuring.
The debtholders then relied on their statutory and contractual rights to
influence the terms of the company's restructuring. In Allied and Kmart,
the debtholders used their blocking position in any vote on a Chapter 11
plan to influence management and operational changes and facilitate a debt-
for-equity exchange.' 4 6  In Schefenacker and Jarvis, the debtholders
asserted their rights as controlling secured debtholders to effectuate an out-
of-court restructuring of the companies' respective capital structures,
despite the existence of junior creditors and shareholders. 147 In each case,
the debtholders ended up owning a controlling position in the reorganized
company's equity. 148
A debtholder's statutory rights can differ significantly from country to
country. 149 As shown by the similar results in Allied, Schefenacker, Jarvis,
and Kmart, a debtholder's statutory rights in the United States and the
United Kingdom overlap to some extent. As shown by the different
approaches used in the cases, however, differences do exist and do affect
144. Under both U.S. and U.K. law, secured creditors generally have superior rights to
payment and to the collateral securing their loans. See, e.g., BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS &
TERRENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS 162-63 (1998) (discussing the benefits to
security and noting that "[s]ecurity helps a creditor in relation to the debtor but equally
important, protects a creditor from other creditors"); see also VANESSA FINCH, CORPORATE
INSOLVENCY LAW 75-79 (2002) (providing an overview of secured creditors' rights in
United Kingdom); IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-91
(James J. Fawcett ed., 2d ed. 2005) (same); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G.
Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COM.
L.J. 105 (2001) (providing an overview of secured creditors' rights in the United States
outside of bankruptcy). These rights give secured creditors substantial leverage in
restructuring negotiations, particularly if the creditors' claims are undersecured or just fully
secured and leave little value for other stakeholders. For an overview of creditor priorities in
both U.S. and U.K. insolvencies, see CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra, at 39-40.
145. See infra Part III.A. 1-2.
146. See supra Part ILA, D.
147. See supra Part II.B-C.
148. See supra Part II.
149. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 144, at 4-8 ("[D]espite numerous general
resemblances, national insolvency laws and procedures differ from one another almost
infinitely in ways both great and small.").
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the types of opportunities presented to distressed debt investors in each
country.
1. Opportunities for Activist Distressed Debt Investing Under U.S. Law
In the United States, corporate bankruptcy generally is not viewed as a
disgraceful event. 150 Large corporate failures such as United Airlines,
Macy's, and Kmart have largely desensitized the American public to the
stigma once associated with bankruptcy.' 5 ' This growing public acceptance
of corporate failure, coupled with the well-developed U.S. bankruptcy laws,
allows investors in the United States to use the bankruptcy system in their
negotiations with troubled companies.
The Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of U.S. bankruptcy law. 152
The Bankruptcy Code provides two basic alternatives for a financially
troubled company. The company can attempt to reorganize its financial
affairs under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 153 Alternatively, it can
liquidate its assets to pay its creditors under Chapter 7.154
A company in a Chapter 11 case generally stays in control of its business
and the restructuring process. 155 A company in a Chapter 7 case, however,
loses control of both. A Chapter 7 trustee is appointed to manage and
liquidate the company's assets; investigate and pursue claims on behalf of
the company (which can include claims against former management); and
150. See, e.g., Erin K. Healy, All's Fair in Love and Bankruptcy? Analysis of the
Property Requirement for Section 109 Eligibility and Its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 535, 542 & n.41 (2004) ("While a
bankruptcy filing in other countries continues to carry significant stigma, U.S. companies
and individuals are not subjected to the same shame merely as a result of filing a petition for
bankruptcy."); Martin, supra note 13, at 25-26 ("There seems to be less stigma associated
with a failing business in the United States than with a personal bankruptcy, probably due to
the U.S. notion that some risk is good and necessary to a well-functioning capitalist
economy.").
151. See Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith Requirement:
Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead to the Incorrect
Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77, 77 n.2 (1992) (citing Chapter 11 cases of Texaco, Revco, and
Continental for similar proposition).
152. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006) (Bankruptcy Code). For a discussion of the history
to, and the development of, the Bankruptcy Code, see CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note
144, at 63-106. The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005. See Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). The 2005 Amendments largely addressed
consumer bankruptcy. Nevertheless, certain changes also were made to the corporate
reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. These changes did shorten a debtor's
exclusive period to file a reorganization plan and limit the types of retention and severance
benefits available to a debtor's top management. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(c), 1121(d). These
changes, however, did not alter the basic management-driven structure of Chapter 11.
153. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (general Chapter 11 provisions of
Bankruptcy Code).
154. See generally id. §§ 701-727 (general Chapter 7 provisions of Bankruptcy Code).
155. Id. § 1107 (discussing duties of company as a debtor in possession).
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pay the company's creditors. 15 6 For this reason, companies prefer to
address their financial issues in the Chapter 1 1 context.
a. Debtholders' Rights Under Chapter 11
Debtholders can play a significant role in a company's Chapter 1 1 case
from the very outset. Debtholders can file an involuntary petition for
bankruptcy against the company, thereby triggering the Chapter 11 case. 157
The company's board of directors also has the ability to file a voluntary
petition for bankruptcy on behalf of the company. 158 In either context, the
company's board and management team typically stay in place and run the
Chapter 11 case for the company. Certain parties, including debthoJders,
can seek to displace the board and management with a trustee, but the
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee is the rare exception, rather than the
rule. 159
Threats to commence an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the
company or to seek the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee are useful
weapons in a debtholder's arsenal. These threats, however, typically are
made in the negotiating room and rarely ripen into full-blown litigation.' 60
Companies and debtholders generally recognize the value destruction that
can accompany such litigation.' 61
Consequently, debtholders often invoke different means to influence a
Chapter 11 debtor's corporate affairs. These means include the priority and
156. Id. §§ 701-704 (discussing selection of trustee and duties of trustee).
157. Id. § 303 (discussing involuntary bankruptcy case).
158. Id. § 301 (discussing voluntary bankruptcy case).
159. Id. § 1104 (discussing appointment of trustee or examiner).
160. See Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 17, at 1012 (explaining that, in an empirical
study, in "twenty-five percent of cases involving bankrupt firms, creditors threatened to
petition the court to have a trustee appointed unless managers resigned"; however, a trustee
was appointed in only one of these cases); see also Peter Edmonston, Atkins Cleared to
Emerge, DAILY DEAL, Dec. 22, 2005 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (noting that
unsecured creditors threatened to sue debtor regarding prepetition transactions, but then
dropped suit for concessions in plan); Adina Genn, Hurting Firms Dart for Bankruptcy
Protection, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 30, 2005, at 5A ("'The threat of creditor-
proposed plans may be daunting enough to persuade companies in bankruptcy to reach a
consensus with their creditors more quickly .... ' (quoting Rick Antonoff, Pillsbury
Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP)).
161. See Alexander L. Paskay & Frances Pilaro Wolstenholme, Chapter 11: A Growing
Cash Cow-Some Thoughts on How to Rein in the System, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv.
331, 337 (1993) ("There are several areas within bankruptcy litigation that lead to excessive
costs. These include bad faith litigation, unnecessary stay litigation under section 362(d)(2),
adequate protection and cash collateral litigation, and disclosure statement litigation."); see
also Stewart L. Cohen & David Peress, Administrative Insolvency: What's a Secured
Creditor to Do?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2001, at 34, 34 ("[L]itigation over issues
such as conversion, dismissal and adequate protection leads to the incurrence of additional
expenses as time marches on and ultimately contributes to administrative insolvency.");
Bruce V. Bigelow, Reorganization Cost Peregrine $54.7 Million; Final Accounting Given in
Bankruptcy Filings, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 8, 2006, at C-I (explaining large fees and
delay incurred in the Peregrine Systems, Inc. Chapter 11 case because of "'hostile and
contentious' litigation").
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voting scheme associated with a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization and
postpetition (i.e., postbankruptcy) and prepetition (i.e., prebankruptcy)
contract rights.
i. Influence Through the Plan Process
The plan of reorganization is a key component of Chapter 11.162
Fundamentally, the plan is a contract between the debtor and its creditors.
The plan details how the debtor will reconfigure its capital and, in some
instances, operational structure, and includes the terms of repayment of the
debtor's prepetition debt. 16 3 The debtor typically designs and presents the
plan after consultation with the debtor's major creditor groups. After an
initial period during which the debtor has the exclusive right to propose a
plan, creditors and shareholders also may propose a plan for the debtor. 64
Debtholders can use the plan process to their advantage in a number of
respects. First, the debtholder can seek a seat at the plan negotiating
table. 165 Debtors often reach out to the holders of their secured debt to
discuss the treatment of the debt under the plan. If the debtor does not
make this gesture, creditors can be proactive. A creditor's motion for relief
from the automatic stay, objection to the use of cash collateral, or motion
for the appointment of a trustee can help open a dialogue with the debtor on
the structure and terms of the plan. 166 The amount of debt held by a
debtholder also can get the debtor's attention. Allied exemplifies this
strategy. Yucaipa emerged virtually overnight as the company's largest
162. 11 U. S.C. § 1123 (describing contents of plan).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1 121(c)-(d). This "exclusivity" period may be extended or shortened. The
appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee terminates the debtor's exclusivity.
165. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 30. Distressed debt investors have several
options for purchasing a seat at the negotiating table, including by buying into a distressed
loan or bond issuance or directly lending to the debtor. See supra Part I.A. 1; see also Suniati
Yap, Investing in Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures or White Knights?, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 153, 163 (1995) (noting that, in certain circumstances, an investor may be able to
purchase a debtor's debt through a tender offer).
166. The automatic stay of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a debtholder-
even a secured debtholder-from taking any action against a debtor or its property on
account of a prepetition debt without prior bankruptcy court approval. II U.S.C. § 362. In
addition, a debtor must obtain the debtholder's consent or bankruptcy court approval to use
the debtholder's cash collateral. Id. § 363. As noted above, a debtholder also may request
the appointment of a trustee or examiner in the debtor's Chapter 11 case. Id. § 1104. These
sections provide a debtholder with standing to be heard before the bankruptcy court on issues
often central to the debtor's restructuring efforts. Id. § 1109. Activist investors also may file
objections to relief being requested by the debtor to assert their position and interest in the
debtor's case. See, e.g., Second Lien Committee's: (1) Objection to Debtors' Motion for
Authority to Enter into Conditional Waiver and Forbearance Agreement with the DIP
Lenders; and (2) Notice of Offer to Purchase Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets for
$175 Million Under Bankruptcy Code Section 363 and to Act as Stalking Horse Bidder in
Court Authorized Auction Process, In re Werner Holding Co. (DE), Inc., No. 06-
10578(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2007) (Docket No. 940) (objecting to debtors'
requested relief under DIP Loan and making offer to purchase debtors' assets).
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creditor and immediately was accepted into the restructuring negotiations
between the company and the Teamsters. 167
Unsecured debtholders also have an opportunity to influence plan
negotiations by seeking appointment to the official committee of unsecured
creditors (the creditors' committee). 168 The creditors' committee typically
consists of seven or more of the debtor's largest unsecured creditors, and it
acts as a fiduciary for all of the debtor's unsecured creditors. 169  A
creditors' committee generally receives access to the debtor's financial and
business plans and can greatly influence the direction of the debtor's
Chapter 11 case. Kmart is typical of this strategy. ESL and Third Avenue
were appointed to the Financial Institutions' Committee after purchasing a
controlling amount of Kmart's bank and bond debt. 170 ESL and Third
Avenue then used their committee seats to open a direct line of
communication with the company. A committee seat, however, also can
create potential conflicts for an activist debtholder.171
Second, debtholders holding a controlling position in the debt likely have
a blocking position in the plan voting process. Under a reorganization plan,
creditors' claims, as well as shareholders' interests, are separated into
classes. 172 Creditors holding at least half in number and two-thirds in
amount of the claims voting on the plan in each class must vote to approve
the plan. 173 If the type of debt held by the debtholder is designated as a
separate class, the debtholder should be able to control the class vote. If the
debt is classified with other secured or unsecured debt, the debtholder may
need the cooperation of other holders to assert a firm blocking position.174
Notably, a controlling debtholder proposing its own plan or working with
the company to propose a plan can try to structure the voting classes in a
manner favorable to the debtholder. 175
167. See supra Part II.A.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 1103; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 30.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1); Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, Creditors' Committee
Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229, 255 n. 116 (2003).
170. See supra Part II.D.
171. A committee member's access to nonpublic information and fiduciary duties to other
creditors may restrict the creditor's ability to pursue its own interests. See, e.g., ROSENBERG,
supra note 22, at 31 (explaining conflict for committee members created by holding
nonpublic information); Zipes & Lambert, supra note 169, at 244-49 (explaining potential
issues raised by claims trading and committee members who represent specific interests).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (discussing plan classification); see also ROSENBERG, supra note
22, at 32-33 (explaining blocking tactics in Chapter 11 context).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (discussing plan voting requirements).
174. ESL Investments, Inc. (ESL) joined forces with Third Avenue Trust (Third Avenue)
in Kmart to create a blocking position. See supra Part IID; see also ROSENBERG, supra note
22, at 32 (explaining the blocking tactics of one distressed debt investor as follows: "If he
cannot for some reason build the required position in the bonds, he will link arms with other
investors whose holdings can make up the difference").
175. For a general discussion of issues relating to plan classification, see Peter E. Meltzer,
Disenfranchising the Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification or Artificial
Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281 (1992).
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In Allied, Yucaipa exercised this sort of control over the treatment and
classification of secured claims. For example, Class 1 under Allied's plan
addressed the classification and treatment of "Allowed Other Secured
Claims."'176 The plan contemplated that this class would be subdivided "so
that each holder of any Secured Claim against each Debtor is in a Class by
itself, except to the extent that there are Secured Claims that are
substantially similar to each other and may be included within a single
Class."'177 The plan then listed six different potential treatments for secured
claims to be selected and implemented by Yucaipa. If a secured claim was
paid in full or reinstated under section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
secured creditor was deemed unimpaired and could not vote on the plan.' 78
If other treatment was accorded to the secured claim, the secured creditor
was entitled to vote.179 The plan also gave Yucaipa the right to amend or
modify the treatment accorded to any secured claim, including whether or
not its holder was entitled to vote on the plan, up to three days before the
plan confirmation hearing.'80 This structure gave Yucaipa substantial
flexibility in deciding whether to pay off or negotiate with secured creditors
to obtain an affirmative vote on the plan from each secured claim class.
To confirm a plan of reorganization, each class of impaired creditors and
shareholders must vote in favor of the plan. 181 If the requisite vote is not
obtained, the debtor (or plan proponent) can still seek court approval of the
plan under the "cramdown" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.' 82 To do
so, the debtor (or plan proponent) must show that at least one class of
impaired creditors voted in favor of the plan and that the plan is fair and
equitable and satisfies the absolute priority rule. 183
A distressed debt investor's ability to participate in plan negotiations or
influence the company's reorganization is enhanced if the investor holds
secured debt or a position in multiple tranches of the company's debt.
Security allows a debtholder to demand repayment in full before the
company makes any distributions to junior creditors.' 8 4 It also allows the
creditor to "credit bid" its debt in, or potentially block, a sale of the debtor's
assets that are included in the debtholder's collateral package. 185 Likewise,
holding a position in multiple tranches of the company's debt makes it more
176. Joint Plan of Reorganization of Allied Holdings, Inc. and Affiliated Debtors
Proposed by the Debtors, Yucaipa and the Teamsters National Automobile Transportation
Industry Negotiating Committee at 25, In re Allied Holdings, Inc., No. 05-12515 (Bankr.





181. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2006) (discussing general plan confirmation requirements).
182. Id. § 1129(b) (discussing cramdown requirements).
183. Id.
184. See supra note 144 (discussing rights of secured creditors in the United States and
United Kingdom).
185. For a discussion of credit bidding in the context of debtor-in-possession financing,
see infra Part III.A. 1.a.ii.
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difficult for the debtor to weaken the debtholder's blocking position
through plan classification. 186 It also gives the debtholder a larger stake in
the company and the results of the restructuring, which often equates with a
more influential voice at the negotiating table.
In Kmart, ESL, and Third Avenue held a portion of each of Kmart's
significant unsecured debt-i.e., Kmart's bank, bond, and trade debt. Their
multiple holdings gave ESL and Third Avenue a vote in each of three
separate classes under the Kmart plan. Class 3 contemplated a 40%
recovery for bank claims, Class 4 contemplated a 14.4% recovery for bond
claims and Class 5 contemplated a 9.7% recovery for trade claims.187 ESL
and Third Avenue collectively held approximately 35% of the bank debt,
56% of the bond debt, and 32% of the trade debt.188 Although the two
debtholders alone could not carry the vote in each class, they likely could
block each class from accepting the plan.
ii. Influence Through Contract
Debtholders also may gain an advantage in a Chapter 11 case through
their postpetition or prepetition contracts with the debtor. One of the most
influential contracts in a Chapter 11 case is the debtor-in-possession
financing facility (DIP Loan). 189 DIP Loans provide a debtor with access to
capital on a postpetition basis. This financing often is critical to the
debtor's successful reorganization, providing the debtor with sufficient
liquidity to operate its business during the Chapter 11 case. 190
The Bankruptcy Code includes special protections for lenders under DIP
Loans. For example, a debtor can offer "superpriority" to a DIP Loan
lender, allowing the lender to be paid ahead of other priority claims
established by the Bankruptcy Code. 191 Similarly, the debtor can offer the
lender a priming first lien in assets encumbered by prepetition security
interests, allowing the lender to trump the interests of prepetition secured
creditors. 192 These protections are subject to certain qualifications and to
186. If a debtholder holds a blocking position in all impaired classes of claims, or at least
the significant classes, the debtor most likely will be unable to cram down the plan over the
debtholder's objection. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (discussing cramdown requirements).
187. Kmart Disclosure Statement, supra note 126, at xi-xiv.
188. For a discussion of ESL and Third Avenue debt holdings, see supra Part II.D.
189. See generally Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 1236-42 (describing the
mechanics and use of DIP Loans in Chapter 11 cases); Kuney, supra note 9, at 46-74
(same); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-Possession
Financing, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 1905, 1917-22 (2004) (same).
190. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("It
is given that most successful reorganizations require the debtor-in-possession to obtain new
financing simultaneously with or soon after the commencement of the Chapter 11 case.").
191. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(l)-(3) (allowing the debtor, under certain circumstances, to offer
a debtor-in-possession financing loan (DIP Loan) lender priority ahead of all administrative
claims and a security interest in encumbered assets or a junior interest in encumbered assets).
192. Id. § 364(d)(1) (allowing the debtor, under certain circumstances, to offer a DIP
Loan lender a first security interest in encumbered assets).
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court approval. Nevertheless, they help debtors attract postpetition credit
and provide control opportunities to the DIP Loan lender.
DIP Loan lenders also can obtain significant contractual protections.
These protections include financial and operational covenants that allow the
lender to foreclose on its collateral package or otherwise exercise control
over the debtor's assets upon a default. 193 A DIP Loan lender's rights often
can be exercised without further approval of the court or relief from the
automatic stay. 194 Moreover, DIP Loans typically provide the lenders with
veto rights over operational changes, assets, acquisitions, or dispositions or
other major transactions related to the debtor's restructuring efforts. 195
These rights essentially allow the lenders to dictate how and if the debtor
achieves its restructuring goals.
A distressed debt investor interested in influencing a debtor's affairs may
use a DIP Loan for this purpose. 196 A distressed debt investor acting as a
company's DIP Loan lender gains several advantages. It is given access to
nonpublic information about the company, and it can demand frequent
financial and operational reports from the debtor.' 97 It can try to influence
the debtor's business decisions through covenants. 198 A DIP Loan lender
also may seek to credit bid its debt for the company's assets if the
restructuring efforts fail. 199
The use of DIP Loans to influence management decisions or acquire
ownership of the company is becoming more common.200  For example,
distressed debt investor Black Diamond Commercial Finance LLP invoked
this strategy in the Chapter 11 case of Werner Co. Werner is the world's
193. See Kuney, supra note 9, at 56 ("A violation of these covenants is typically an event
of default under the DIP loan documents entitling the lender to relief from the stay and the
ability to immediately realize upon its security, begin assessing default interest rates and
penalty fees, and terminate any further financing."); see also Baird & Rasmussen, supra note
10, at 1239-40; Skeel, supra note 189, at 1918-19.
194. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 1239; Kuney, supra note 9, at 68-69.
195. See Kuney, supra note 9, at 52-57.
196. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 1245-46 (observing that entrenched
management "will readily agree to covenants that give them breathing space today even if
these terms promise to deliver the business to the creditors should current efforts not pan
out").
197. See Kuney, supra note 9, at 52-53.
198. Id. at 53-54 & nn.162-64; see also Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-In-Possession
Financing, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097, 3108 (2004) ("In 90% of the cases, DIP loans have
restrictions on specified operating expenses and operating activities.").
199. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (2006); see also David Peress & Thomas C. Prinzhorn,
Nontraditional Lenders and the Impact of Loan-to-Own Strategies on the Restructuring
Process, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48 (discussing loan to own strategies); infra Part
III.A. 1.a.ii (discussing Werner's and Radnor's Chapter 11 cases).
200. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 189, at 1920-21, 1931 (suggesting that DIP Loans have
replaced claims trading as the control mechanism of choice for distressed debt investors and
citing U.S. Air's parent company UAL Corp. and TWA as two cases in which the DIP Loans
were used to dictate the terms of the Chapter II cases and give the DIP Loan lenders control
of the debtors).
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leading manufacturer and distributor of ladders.201 Its financial troubles
were sparked by a highly leveraged balance sheet and increased production
costs. Black Diamond extended Werner a $99 million DIP Loan to help
Werner address these issues in the Chapter 11 context. 20 2  After
approximately nine months in Chapter 11, Werner decided to sell its
business. A group led by Black Diamond emerged as the successful bidder,
with the majority of the purchase price paid through the cancellation of
indebtedness, including the DIP Loan.20 3
The Chapter 11 case of Radnor Holding Corp. is another example of this
practice. In Radnor, Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC and two of its
affiliates made certain prepetition investments in Radnor.204  These
investments included the purchase of $25 million in preferred stock and the
extension of $85 million in secured credit.205 Radnor's financial situation,
however, did not improve. The company then entered into a sale agreement
and DIP Loan agreement with Tennenbaum. The DIP Loan provided
Radnor with sufficient liquidity to consummate a sale in Chapter 11 and
allowed Tennenbaum to credit bid its secured claims against Radnor in the
201. Press Release, Werner Co., Werner Completes Asset Sale and Emerges from
Bankruptcy (June 11, 2007), available at http://wernerladder.mediaroom.com/index.php?
s=press releases&item=31.
202. Company's Press Release Announcing Chapter 11 Filing, WERNER LADDER BANKR.
NEWS (Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pa.), June 14, 2006, at 3, 3,
available at http://bankrupt.com/werner.txt; see also Debtors' Motion for Order (I)
Authorizing Debtors (A) to Obtain Post-petition Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105,
361, 362, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), and 364(d)(1) and (B) to Utilize Cash Collateral
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (II) Granting Adequate Protection to Pre-petition Secured
Parties Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364, (III) Scheduling Interim and Final
Hearings Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(B) and (C), and (IV) Approving Re-Purchase
of Certain Accounts Receivable Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 105(a), at 2-3, 12-23, In
re Werner Holding Co. (DE), Inc., No. 06-10578(KJC) (Bankr. D. Del. June 12, 2006)
(Docket No. 18).
203. See Press Release, Werner Co., supra note 201 (describing closing of sale); Michael
Roknick, Werner Sale a Done Deal; Jobs Safe Under Terms of Sale, HERALD (Sharon, Pa.),
June 11, 2007, available at http://www.sharon-herald.com/homepage/local-story_ 162214
545.html?keyword=leadpicturestory (noting that Werner "completed its sale to a multi-
investment group in a deal valued at $270 million"); see also Werner, No. 06-10578(KJC),
slip op. (Apr. 26, 2007) (Docket No. 1366) (order approving sale); Debtors' Motion for
Entry of an Order (I) Approving Sale of Substantially All of Debtors' Assets Free and Clear
of Liens, Claims, Interests, and Encumbrances; (II) Authorizing and Approving the Purchase
Agreement; (III) Authorizing and Approving the Assumption and Assignment and Sale of
Certain Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in Connection with Such Sale; (IV)
Authorizing the Exemption of the Sale from Stamp and Similar Taxes and (V) Granting
Related Relief, Werner, No. 06-10578 (KJC) (Mar. 27, 2007) (Docket No. 1231) [hereinafter
Werner Sale Motion] (explaining terms of proposed sale).
204. See In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 BR. 820, 830 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(explaining prepetition relationship between debtors and Tennenbaum Capital Partners LLC
(Tennenbaum)); see also Disclosure Statement with Respect to Joint Plan of Liquidation of
Radnor Holdings Corporation and Its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors in Possession at 12-13,
Radnor, 353 B.R. 820 (No. 06-10894 (PJW)) (Docket No. 1080) [hereinafter Radnor
Disclosure Statement] (same).
205. See Radnor, 353 B.R. at 830-33; Radnor Disclosure Statement, supra note 204, at
12-13.
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sale process. 20 6 Tennenbaum's bid to acquire ownership of Radnor through
its prepetition and postpetition secured claims was approved by the
Delaware Bankruptcy Court.207
The investor in Radnor used its prepetition secured creditor position to
negotiate the DIP Loan and to enhance its bidding leverage in the
contemplated asset sale. Other distressed debt investors likewise may find
opportunities to assert control over a debtor under the terms of their
prepetition contracts. Acceleration, default interest rate, and subordination
provisions are among the provisions that may be useful in this context.20 8
The utility of such prepetition provisions, however, is limited by the
automatic stay, reinstatement, and other similar provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.20 9 Prepetition contract provisions often are more useful
to investors in the out-of-court restructuring context.
b. Debtholders' Rights Outside of Chapter 11
A Chapter 11 case is an expensive and time-consuming process. In
addition, it can adversely affect a company's business operations. Although
the stigma historically associated with bankruptcy is less pervasive in the
United States, some customers, vendors, suppliers, and others remain
hesitant to do business with a bankrupt company. 2 10 Accordingly, in some
circumstances, an out-of-court restructuring may preserve more value for
the company and its stakeholders. An out-of-court restructuring typically is
a consensual restructuring of the company's capital structure. 21 1
206. See Radnor, 353 B.R. at 836-37; Radnor Disclosure Statement, supra note 204, at
18-19.
207. See Radnor Disclosure Statement, supra note 204, at ii-iii (explaining that the
bankruptcy court approved the debtors' motion to sell substantially all of their assets to
Tennenbaum and that "[t]he Debtors closed on the Sale on November 29, 2006").
208. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text (discussing leverage accompanying
such provisions); see also David Line Batty & Jo Ann J. Brighton, "Silent" Second Liens-
Will Bankruptcy Courts Keep the Peace?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 8-29 (2005) (explaining
the enforcement of subordination and intercreditor agreements in prepetition loan
documents); David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien
Priority, 38 VAND. L. REv. 975, 983-89, 996-1007, 1019-24 (1985) (discussing
enforcement of debt and lien subordination provisions in bankruptcy).
209. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1124 (2006) (describing automatic stay and
reinstatement provisions of Bankruptcy Code); see also Paul Baisier, Second-Lien
Financing-More Good, Bad and Ugly: A Decision at Last, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2007,
at 50, 50 (2007) (noting that "substantial case law says that pre-petition agreements that
change substantive bankruptcy rights are not enforceable"); infra note 396 (noting judicial
restraints on lender influence of corporate affairs).
210. Vendors and suppliers can incur significant monetary losses on prepetition claims in
a bankruptcy case. In addition, these parties can incur significant expenses if they try to
participate in the debtor's Chapter 11 case. Consequently, these parties may prefer not to do
business with a bankrupt or potentially bankrupt business. See generally Jon M. Labovitz,
Taking a Fresh Look at DIP Budgeting, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2005, at 34, 34 n.35
(describing factors that may strain relations between debtors and their vendors, suppliers,
and customers).
211. See generally Conrad B. Duberstein, Out-of-Court Workouts, I AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 347, 349-51 (1993) (providing a general overview of out-of-court restructuring
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Debtholders can wield significant influence in an out-of-court
restructuring. This potential for influence stems largely from the
debtholders' contractual rights, with the threat of bankruptcy (and the
debtholders' rights under bankruptcy law) looming in the background. 212
The same type of covenants, default and acceleration provisions, and
collateral rights discussed above in the context of DIP Loans can be very
useful to distressed debt investors seeking control. 213 These provisions are
common in loan documents with distressed companies. They also are used
in bond indentures; however, covenants in indentures governing public
bond issuances tend to be weaker than their counterparts in the private loan
setting.214  Consequently, the threat of bankruptcy and a distressed
bondholders' blocking position in any Chapter 11 case may be more useful
to an individual distressed bondholder than the terms of the indenture itself.
An individual debtholder also can influence the results of an out-of-court
restructuring by withholding its consent to the restructuring plan. A
company cannot bind dissenting debtholders, called "holdouts," to an out-
of-court restructuring plan.215 The holdout problem frequently presents
itself in the context of public bond issuances. The Trust Indenture Act of
1939 governs bonds, notes, debentures, and other certificates of
indebtedness and the related indentures issued through a public offering.216
agreements and noting that these "agreement[s] may either provide an extension of the time
period in which the debtor's obligations become due, without altering the amount of the
claims of the creditors, or fashion a settlement, sometimes known as a composition
agreement, which will reduce the amount to be paid to creditors with provisions for payment
either in cash or over a period of time").
212. See, e.g., Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy
and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1211, 1222-23
(1994) ("[I]f a debtor lacks ready cash or its financial distress is too acute in other ways,
immediate bankruptcy reorganization may be preferable to attempting a workout."); James
H.M. Sprayregen et al., Chapter 11: Not Perfect, but Better than the Alternative, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2005, at 1, 60 ("[C]hapter 11 is but one, albeit a critical, part of a
broader restructuring market that also includes a vast number of out-of-court workouts
because it serves as a critical court-supervised market of last resort when a consensual deal is
not made.").
213. See supra Part III.A.l.a.ii; see also C. Edward Dobbs, Negotiating Points in Second
Lien Financing Transactions, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 189 (2006) (describing provisions
that maintain secured lenders' rights in intercreditor agreements).
214. See, e.g., Efrat Lev, The Indenture Trustee: Does It Really Protect Bondholders?, 8
U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 47, 84-85 (1999) (noting trend away from protective bondholder
covenants); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 660-61 (1996) (explaining covenants in bond indentures); F. John
Stark et al., "Marriott Risk": A New Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from
Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 503, 544-46 (explaining covenants
typically included in bond indentures and noting that "[blond indenture covenants
traditionally occupied a middle ground between comprehensiveness and the relative absence
of restrictions which is typical in investment grade bonds today").
215. See, e.g., Mendales, supra note 212, at 1227-33.
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa, 77ddd(a) (2006); see also George W. Shuster, The Trust
Indenture Act and International Debt Restructurings, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 431, 437
(2006) ("Section 316(b) was adopted with a specific purpose in mind-to prevent out-of-
court debt restructurings from being forced upon minority bondholders."). Interest payments
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Under the Act, an indenture cannot permit the impairment or modification
of an individual bondholder's right to receive the "payment of the principal
of and interest ... on or after the respective due dates ... or to institute suit
for the enforcement of any such payment" without the consent of the
bondholder. 217
The consensual nature of an out-of-court restructuring limits its
usefulness. For example, most out-of-court restructuring plans involve a
restructuring only of the company's bank and bond debt.2 18 General
unsecured claims held by customers, suppliers, vendors, and others remain
intact, as do shareholders' interests. This result is in stark contrast to
Chapter 11, under which creditors' claims and shareholders' interests can
be modified or even extinguished without the consent of the holder.
c. Debtholders' Rights Under Prepackaged and Prenegotiated
Restructurings
If holdouts prevent an out-of-court restructuring, the company may
pursue a prepackaged restructuring plan. A prepackaged restructuring plan
looks very similar to an out-of-court restructuring in that it typically
modifies the payment terms of only bank and bond debt.219 It, however,
also may seek to facilitate an asset sale or a debt-for-equity exchange. A
company proposing a prepackaged plan uses the Bankruptcy Code to
eliminate any holdout problems and to implement structural changes that
might not otherwise be feasible in the out-of-court context. 220
Mechanically, a company negotiates and solicits acceptances of the
prepackaged plan outside of bankruptcy. This solicitation process is
governed by applicable nonbankruptcy law, typically federal securities
laws.221 The company strives to obtain approval of the plan from more than
half in number and two-thirds in amount of each class of debtholders whose
rights are modified under the plan.222 This approval threshold satisfies the
can be suspended, however, with a supermajority (75%) vote of the bondholders. See 15
U.S.C. § 77ppp(a)(2) to (b).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b).
218. See, e.g., Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 17, at 1007 ("Out-of-court restructuring
is economically equivalent to formal bankruptcy, because the firm's fixed claims are either
renegotiated or replaced with new claims on terms that reduce the firm's overall fixed
payment burden."); Mendales, supra note 212, at 1223-33 (describing common obstacles to
out-of-court restructurings).
219. See, e.g., John D. Ayer et al., Out-of-Court Workouts, Prepacks and Pre-Arranged
Cases: A Primer, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2005, at 16, 56 (explaining that a successful
prepackaged plan requires a small, concentrated creditor group).
220. See, e.g., id. at 16 ('"Pre-packaging' a chapter 11 reorganization enables a debtor to
minimize the impact to its ongoing business operations by combining many of the best
aspects of out-of-court workouts-cost-efficiency, speed, flexibility and cooperation-with
the binding effect and structure of a conventional bankruptcy."); Yap, supra note 165, at 173
("Second, only by filing a Chapter 11 proceeding and obtaining the protection of the court,
can a company reject disadvantageous contracts and experience limited liability.").
221. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 126(b)(1) (2006) (discussing plan solicitation provisions).
222. See id. § 1 126(b)(1), (c) (discussing plan solicitation provisions).
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plan voting requirements under the Bankruptcy Code. The company then
commences a Chapter 11 case to obtain court approval of the plan, which
binds any dissenting debtholders and allows the company to cram down the
plan on shareholders. 223 The cram-down feature in this context permits a
debt-for-equity exchange that otherwise would require shareholder
approval. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation is an illustration of the
prepackaged plan technique. 224
A distressed debt investor who holds a position in a company's debt
sufficient to meet the Bankruptcy Code's plan voting requirements-either
alone or with like-minded investors-can use the prepackaged plan process
to its advantage. The process often is quicker and cheaper than a traditional
Chapter 11 case. 225 It also allows an investor to influence the company's
restructuring despite dissenting debt and equity holders.
Nevertheless, the prepackaged plan process can be unsatisfying from the
distressed debt investor's perspective. The investor generally is limited to
restructuring the company's bank and bond debt. 226 More complex changes
to the company's contracts, corporate structure, or unsecured trade debt
generally are not feasible under this process. Likewise, solicitation of the
prepackaged plan occurs prior to the Chapter 11 filing and without court
oversight, and thus, is subject to potential challenge in the subsequent
Chapter 11 case. 227
Accordingly, some distressed debt investors find a prenegotiated plan
process more attractive. 228 In this process, the company and the investor
negotiate the terms of the Chapter 11 plan prior to filing the Chapter 1 1
case. 229  The plan can include any provision permitted under the
Bankruptcy Code and affect any class of claimants because all impaired
classes are given an opportunity to vote on the plan. The solicitation of the
223. See id. §§ 1129(a)-(b), 1141 (explaining requirements for, and impact of, plan
confirmation).
224. See Disclosure Statement with Respect to Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization of Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation and Its Affiliate Debtors at 20-
49, In re Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York, Inc., No. 07-12395 (BRL), 2007 WL
2779438 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2007) (Docket No. 36) [hereinafter Bally Disclosure
Statement] (explaining terms of prepackaged plan of reorganization); Motion of Debtors for
Order, Pursuant to Section 1127(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3019,
Authorizing the Debtors to Modify Their Joint Prepackaged Chapter 11 Plan of
Reorganization, Bally, No. 07-12395 (BRL) (August 13, 2007) (Docket No. 179)
[hereinafter Bally Motion to Modify] (explaining terms of modified prepackaged plan of
reorganization); see also infra note 340.
225. See, e.g., Ayer et al., supra note 219, at 16.
226. See, e.g., Yap, supra note 165, at 173 (explaining requirements for prepackaged
Chapter 11 plan); see also GILSON, supra note 22, at 192 ("Prepacks work best for firms
whose problems are more financial than operational in nature and that have relatively less
trade and other nonpublicly traded debt outstanding.").
227. See Ayer et al., supra note 219, at 56.
228. See id. (describing the prenegotiated or "pre-arranged" plan process).
229. See id. ("The most significant procedural difference between a pre-arranged plan and
a prepackaged plan is that solicitation occurs after the bankruptcy case has been filed and
after the court has approved a disclosure statement.")-
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plan then occurs in the Chapter 11 case. 230 Distressed debt investors
seeking control have used this process in cases such as Granite
Broadcasting Corporation, Trump Hotel & Casino Resorts, Inc., and
McLeodUSA, Inc. 231
2. Opportunities for Activist Distressed Debt Investing Under U.K. Law
The stigma often associated with bankruptcy continues to permeate the
public's perception of corporate failure in the United Kingdom.232 The
U.K. public generally is less forgiving of corporate failure than its U.S.
counterpart. This negative perception of bankruptcy stems largely from the
United Kingdom's historical treatment of bankrupts-individuals could be
thrown in prison and corporations were turned over to their creditors.233
The United Kingdom has tried to alleviate this stigma through
amendments to its bankruptcy laws. 234 In 1985, 1986, and 2002, the United
Kingdom passed major revisions to its corporate bankruptcy laws designed
to foster a more rescue-oriented culture.235 The Insolvency Act of 1986
(the Insolvency Act), as amended by the Enterprise Act of 2002 (the
230. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (describing postpetition plan disclosure and solicitation
procedures).
231. See, e.g., Jonathan Berke, Trump Filing Relatively Drama Free, DAILY DEAL, Nov.
22, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing prenegotiated plan between
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts and its bondholders); Ben Fidler, Judge to Rule on Granite
Plan, DAILY DEAL, May 1, 2007 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing
prenegotiated plan between Granite Broadcasting and Silver Point); Peter J. Howe, Shame-
Free Bankruptcy, Telecom Companies Pursue a 'Drive-Through Chapter 11' Strategy in
Prearranged Deals with Their Creditors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2002, at D1 (describing
prenegotiated plan between McLeodUSA and its bondholders).
232. See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 144, at 197 ("'In England insolvency, including
corporate insolvency, is regarded as a disgrace. The stigma has to some extent worn off but
it is nevertheless still there as a reality."'); see also Vantis Warns on Companies Calling
Themselves Bankrupt, FIN. ADVISER, Mar. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.ftadviser.com/FinancialAdviser/Archive/Features/article/20060309/da8e7a88-ea
43-11 dc-ab39-0015171400aa/Vantis-warns-on-companies-calling-themselves-bankrupt.jsp
("'While bankruptcy can relieve uncertainty and stress, it also has a stigma associated with
it. Directors may find it virtually impossible to raise future credit."' (quoting Adrian Doble
of Vantis)).
233. See Martin, supra note 12, at 370-78, 392-98 (explaining history behind U.K.
bankruptcy law and observing that, "[w]hile English laws themselves became more lenient
over time, this unforgiving attitude toward unpaid debt and credit never really changed").
See generally CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 144.
234. See, e.g., Richard Tyler, Monday View: Show Some Enterprise and Help
Entrepreneurs, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 13, 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2950576/Monday-view-Show-some-enterprise-and-help
-entrepreneurs.html (describing the 2002 amendments to the Insolvency Act and noting that
"[they] aimed to reduce the stigma of bankruptcy and encourage the sort of serial
entrepreneurship enjoyed by the US").
235. See generally Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.); Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45 (Eng.);
Insolvency Act, 1985, c. 65 (Eng.).
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Enterprise Act),236 is the primary source of bankruptcy law in the United
Kingdom.237 Similar to the Bankruptcy Code, the Insolvency Act provides
a troubled company with both restructuring (called administration) and
liquidation alternatives. 238  In stark contrast to Chapter 11, however, a
company's management is subject to the direction and control of a third-
party administrator in the restructuring context.239 Accordingly, many
companies and investors continue to view the United Kingdom's
bankruptcy laws as unfavorable and, more importantly, uncertain. 240
a. Debtholders' Rights in an Administration
Debtholders, as well as the company or its directors, may petition the
court for an administration order for the company. 241 The appointment of
an administrator then follows the entry of the administration order.
Alternatively, certain parties may appoint an administrator without court
intervention.242 These parties include the company and debtholders who
hold a qualifying floating charge-i.e., a lien on substantially all of the
company's assets.
243
The stated purpose of an administration is the rehabilitation of the
company. 244 "The out-of-court route for appointment of an administrator
by the company and/or its directors was also introduced to encourage the
greater use of the administration procedure." 245 Nevertheless, historically,
directors and officers have been reluctant to consider an administration
because of the likely loss of control to an administrator.246 This reluctance
works to the advantage of investors trying to influence corporate affairs
236. In addition to amending the United Kingdom's bankruptcy laws, the Enterprise Act
also reformed U.K. competition policy with respect to mergers. See generally Enterprise Act,
2002, c. 40.
237. For a discussion of the history to, and the development of, the Insolvency Act, see
CARRUTHERS & HALLIDAY, supra note 144, at 106-49; and FINCH, supra note 144, at 7-24.
238. The Insolvency Act offers a company three forms of liquidation: members'
voluntary winding up; creditors' voluntary winding up; and winding up by the court. See
Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, pt. IV.
239. Id. sched. B1, paras. 2, 59 (as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, sched. 16)
(explaining who may appoint an administrator and the general powers of an administrator).
240. See, e.g., Tett, supra note 45 (noting the unpredictability of U.K. bankruptcy law and
its impact on U.K. restructurings).
241. Insolvency Act, 1986, sched. B1, para. 12 (as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c.
40, sched. 16) (describing parties that may seek administration order).
242. Id. para. 2 (describing parties that may appoint administrator).
243. "The floating charge ... attaches to a class of the company's assets, both present and
future, rather than to a stipulated item of property." FINCH, supra note 144, at 80.
244. Insolvency Act, 1986, sched. BI, para. 3(1) (as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c.
40, sched. 16) (describing objectives of administration).
245. Vernon Dennis, Insolvency: Evolution Not Revolution, LEGAL WK. (U.K.), May 8,
2003, at 23, 23.
246. See Alan Tilley, European Restructuring: Restructuring Professionals Must Adapt
to New Opportunities, J. PRIVATE EQUITY, Spring 2006, at 102, 103 (noting that, historically,
"[a]ppointed administrators tend to dismiss key management immediately and replace them
with their own staff," and suggesting that administrators may have to change practice going
forward).
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who may be able to extract concessions or implement change at the
company in exchange for covenant waivers or additional credit that permits
the company to avoid filing an administration.247
If an administration is filed, one or more insolvency practitioners will be
appointed as administrators.248 Administrators are officers of the court and
are obligated to act in the best interests of all creditors. 249 They also have
extensive powers over the company, with the ability to control the
company's management, corporate affairs and assets, and to formulate the
company's restructuring plan.250
Secured debtholders, particularly those holding a floating charge, have
significant influence in an administration. First, an administrator cannot
bind secured debtholders to its proposed plan without the debtholders'
consent. 251 Second, floating charge holders have the ability to select the
administrator in both an in- and out-of-court administration. 252 Although
the administrator still owes its duties to all creditors, the party hand-
selecting the administrator has at least a perceived advantage. 253
Unsecured debtholders also can get a seat at the negotiating table in a
company's administration. For example, investors holding 10% or more of
the company's debt can force the administrator to hold a meeting of
247. Likewise, management may use its debtholders' concerns regarding U.K. bankruptcy
law to its advantage. For example, management may cite its potential liability under the
United Kingdom's wrongful trading laws and threaten administration as a means to obtain
necessary waivers or additional liquidity for the company. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §
214 (imposing liability on directors under certain circumstances for wrongful trading).
248. See id. sched. BI, paras. 100-03 (as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, sched.
16) (describing appointment of joint administrators).
249. Id. paras. 3(2), 5 (describing role of administrators).
250. Id. paras. 59-64 (describing powers of administrators).
251. See id. para. 73(1). An administrator can, however, sell assets subject to a floating
charge without court approval and assets subject to a nonfloating (fixed) charge with court
approval, provided that the creditor's priority in the sale proceeds is maintained. Id. paras.
70, 71.
252. Id. paras. 14(1), 36(1); see also Mark Broude et al., An Overview of Global
Insolvency Regimes, in THE GUIDE TO DISTRESSED DEBT AND TURNAROUND INVESTING 31,
40-41 (Kelly Deponte ed., 2007) (describing administration process and noting that a
floating charge holder "is entitled to advance notice and is given the ability to appoint its
own choice as administrator").
253. Notably, the 2002 amendments to the Insolvency Act were intended to weaken the
influence of secured debtholders with floating charges in a company's rescue efforts. See
U.K. DEPT. OF TRADE & INDUS., PRODUCTIVITY AND ENTERPRISE: INSOLVENCY-A SECOND
CHANCE (2001); Tyler, supra note 234 ("The Act weakened the rights of unsecured creditors,
including the Crown, [and] made it easier for directors to call in an administrator when their
businesses ran into trouble."). For example, the amendments severely limit a floating charge
holder's ability to invoke administrative receivership. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 72A
(as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 250). For a general discussion of
administrative receivership, see FINCH, supra note 144, at 234-72. Nevertheless,
opportunities still exist for secured debtholders to influence the administration process. See,
e.g., Insolvency Act, 1986, sched. BI, paras. 14, 35-37 (as amended by Enterprise Act,
2002, c. 40, sched. 16); see also Dennis, supra note 245, at 23 (explaining that banks and
other financial institutions participated in amendment process and certain concessions, which




creditors and appoint a creditors' committee. 254  In addition, investors
holding 51% in value of the company's debt can approve or block an
administrator's proposed restructuring plan.255 If the plan is approved, it
binds all unsecured debtholders with notice of the administration.
Unfortunately, the negotiation that occurs in an administration is likely to
focus primarily on the allocation of sale proceeds. Administration rarely is
used to implement a free-standing reorganization of the company. 256
Consequently, investors wanting to influence corporate affairs must acquire
secured debt or institute discussions with the company and other major
stakeholders in advance of any administration.
b. Debtholders' Rights Outside ofAdministration
A troubled company and its debtholders also may seek to restructure the
company's affairs under a statutory composition or general corporate law.
The Insolvency Act includes one form of composition-a CVA. 257 The
Companies Act of 2006 (Companies Act 2006) provides another form of
composition called a scheme of arrangement (Scheme). 258 Each type of
composition represents a compromise and new contract between the
company and its stakeholders. 259  Alternatively, a company with a
concentrated debtholder group may try to restructure its finances in a less
254. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, sched. B1, paras. 52(2), 56, 57 (as amended by
Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, sched. 16) (describing procedures for creditors' meeting and
appointment of creditors' committee).
255. Insolvency Rules, 1986, S.I.1986/1925, pt. 2, para. 2.43 (U.K.); see also Broude et
al., supra note 252, at 41.
256. See, e.g., Broude et al., supra note 252, at 41 ("While restructurings can be, and
occasionally are, accomplished in an administration through a 'company voluntary
arrangement' or 'scheme of arrangement,' the more likely outcome by far will be either the
going-concern sale on a relatively accelerated basis or the piecemeal liquidation of the
debtor's assets.").
257. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, §§ 1-7B (as amended by Insolvency Act, 2000, c. 39,
sched. 2, pt. 1, para. 10 (Eng.)) (CVA procedures).
258. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895-900 (Eng.) (Scheme procedures). The
Companies Act of 1985 (Companies Act 1985) was substantially amended on November 8,
2006, resulting in the Companies Act of 2006 (Companies Act 2006). The majority of the
provisions of the Companies Act 2006, however, did not go into effect until October 2008.
See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1300; see also Sandy Shandro & Paul Sidle, Reforms to
English Company Law, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2007, at 34, 34. Until that time, the
Companies Act 1985 continued to govern. Section 425 of the Companies Act 1985 governs
Schemes. The Companies Act 2006 "restates the regime currently provided by section 425
of the Companies Act 1985." Shandro & Sidle, supra, at 35.
259. Except in the context of a CVA for small businesses, neither a CVA nor a Scheme
includes a pre-effective date moratorium on the enforcement of creditors' rights.
Consequently, a CVA or a Scheme may be coupled with an administration. See Insolvency
Act, 1986, c. 45, § IA, sched. Al (as amended by Insolvency Act, 2000, c. 39, sched. 1,
paras. 2, 4 (Eng.)); see also id. sched. BI, para. 42 (as amended by Enterprise Act, 2002, c.
40, sched. 16) (describing moratorium available in an administration); FINCH, supra note
144, at 328, 332-33.
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formal manner under the Companies Act 2006 and the United Kingdom's
common law.260
i. Influence Through a CVA
A CVA is similar to a U.S. out-of-court restructuring in that it proceeds
largely without court supervision and is a consensual restructuring
agreement between the company and its creditors. Unlike its U.S.
counterpart, however, a CVA is not subject to a significant holdout problem
for at least two reasons. First, U.K. bond issuances are not subject to any
unanimous consent requirement for the modification of payment terms
similar to that imposed on U.S. bond issuances under the Trust Indenture
Act.2 61 Rather, most bond issuances are subject to collective action clauses,
which allow a supermajority vote (75%) to bind all bondholders to a
restructuring of the terms of the bonds under the indenture. 262 Second, the
Insolvency Act allows a company to bind dissenting unsecured creditors to
the CVA, provided that the CVA receives requisite stakeholder approval.263
The company generally negotiates the terms of the CVA with its major
debtholders. It also works with these debtholders to identify and appoint an
insolvency practitioner as a trustee to implement the CVA. 2 6 4 Although a
CVA generally is considered an out-of-court process, the trustee must file
certain reports with the court.265 The CVA generally takes effect without
formal court approval, unless a creditor appeals within twenty-eight days of
the filing of the trustee's report indicating creditor approval of the CVA.266
260. See infra Part III.A.2.b.iii.
261. See, e.g., Peter J.M. Declercq, Restructuring European Distressed Debt:
Netherlands Suspension of Payment Proceeding... The Netherlands Chapter 11?, 77 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 377, 380-81 (2003) ("Whereas bond indentures for U.S. high yield bonds must
comply with the provisions of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, bond indentures for
European high yield bonds generally do not have to comply with a similar European
statute.").
262. See id. at 381 (noting that most European indentures require only a supermajority
vote (i.e., 75%) to restructure the economic terms of the bonds); see also Kenneth Kletzer,
Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises with Collective Action Clauses, FRBSF ECON. LETrER,
(Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Feb. 20, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2004/el2004-06.pdf (explaining, in the
context of sovereign bonds, collective action clauses and noting studies comparing "interest
rate premiums between bonds issued with and without CACs, focusing on bonds issued in
the UK with those issued in the US").
263. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 5(2)(b); see also Broude et al., supra note 252, at 42-
43; FINCH, supra note 144, at 332.
264. See Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 1 (discussing appointment of trustee).
265. Id. §§ 2(2), 4(6) (indicating, in the first report, the voting deadlines and terms and
purpose of CVA and, in the second report, the results of vote).
266. Id. § 6. A company is not required to separate creditors into separate classes under a
CVA, and a CVA is approved if creditors holding at least 75% in value of unsecured claims
and at least 50% of equity holders vote in favor of the CVA. Insolvency Rules, 1986,
S.I.1986/1925, pt. 1, paras. 1.19(1), 1.20(1) (U.K.); see also FINCH, supra note 144, at 332.
If creditors, but not equity holders, approve the CVA, the company may still seek to
implement the CVA. Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 4A(3) (as amended by Insolvency Act,
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In Schefenacker, the distressed debt investors negotiated with the
company and its controlling shareholder to formulate a comprehensive
restructuring plan. The plan used a CVA to compromise the claims of
Schefenacker's unsecured bondholders and shareholders. 267  The
insolvency practitioners appointed under the CVA made the required filings
with the court and oversaw the voting on, and subsequent implementation
of, the CVA. The deal between the distressed debt investors as secured
creditors, the company, and Dr. Schefenacker was documented in a separate
agreement. 268
Schefenacker is an example of the use of a CVA outside of an
administration. An administration was not needed because the secured
creditors agreed to a moratorium while the parties worked to negotiate the
CVA.2 6 9 Moreover, the company did not default on its unsecured bonds
until February 2007, shortly before the proposal of the CVA to the
bondholders. 270 A standstill provision in the bond indenture prevented the
bondholders from taking action against Schefenacker without the consent of
the secured creditors. 271
ii. Influence Through a Scheme
A Scheme is akin to a Chapter 11 plan in several respects. 272 It may be
used to bind both secured and unsecured creditors, as well as
shareholders. 273 It also involves a formal court procedure that requires
significant disclosure to, and involvement of, the court.274 A Scheme is not
itself an insolvency proceeding, but may be used by an administrator in an
administration.
Distressed debtholders in the United Kingdom may use a Scheme in a
manner similar to a CVA. For example, the debtholders may work with the
company to design a financial restructuring plan that gives the debtholders
control over the company through a debt-for-equity exchange. The primary
2000, c. 39, sched. 2, pt. 1, paras. 1, 5 (Eng.)). A CVA cannot bind secured creditors
without their consent. Id. § 4(3)-(4).
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. Schefenacker CVA, supra note 87, at 26-31.
269. Id. at 23; see also Schefenacker Extends Moratorium with Creditors, EUR.
INTELLIGENCE WIRE, Nov. 28, 2006, available at LEXIS, Europe Intelligence Wire File.
270. Schefenacker Bondholder Objection, supra note 102, at 7-8.
271. Declaration of Mark Sterling in Further Support of the Verified Petition for Order,
exhibit A, at 12-13, In re Schefenacker plc, No. 07-11482 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007)
(Docket No. 75) (indenture dated as of Feb. 11, 2004).
272. See Mayr, supra note 13, at 505 ("For example, the U.K. 'scheme of arrangement'
procedure, which exists in some form in numerous jurisdictions, provides a mechanism to
obtain expeditious court approval of consensual reorganization plans.").
273. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 899(1), (3) (Eng.); see also FINCH, supra note
144, at 325 ("One advantageous feature of the scheme of arrangement is that, if the
arrangement is approved, it may modify the rights of shareholders and creditors and may do
so without their consent.").
274. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895-897; see also FINCH, supra note 144, at
325.
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differences to consider include the ability to bind dissenting creditors under
a Scheme and the time and expense associated with court oversight of a
Scheme. 275
Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 governs Schemes. 276 Under that
section, debt and equity holders must be separated into different classes of
parties holding similar claims against or interests in the company. 277 This
classification requirement is similar to that imposed under Chapter 11. To
proceed with a Scheme, at least 75% in value and 50% in number of the
claims or interests in each designated class must approve the Scheme. 278
This approval threshold is more stringent than that required for either a
CVA or an administration plan. Notably, all classes must approve the
Scheme.279  The court can bind dissenting parties only if their class
approves the Scheme; a Scheme cannot be crammed down on
nonconsenting parties like a Chapter 11 plan.
Debtholders used Schemes to implement debt-for-equity exchanges in
the restructurings of MyTravel and Telewest. In MyTravel, the Scheme
converted the company's senior secured and subordinated bond debt into
approximately 97% of the new company's equity and diluted the holdings
of existing shareholders to less than 3% of the equity.280 In Telewest, the
Scheme converted the company's notes and debentures into 98.5% of the
new company's equity and diluted the holdings of existing shareholders to
1.5%.281 In both cases, bondholders tried to block approval of the Schemes
in order to obtain a greater recovery. 282 The Telewest Scheme was
approved and implemented as proposed by the company and senior
275. See, e.g., Broude et al., supra note 252, at 42 ("Unlike CVAs, however, Schemes are
court-intensive procedures which are more difficult and expensive to implement.").
276. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 895-900 (section 900 relates to the reconstruction or
amalgamation of any company or companies); see also FINCH, supra note 144, at 324-31
(describing generally the procedures).
277. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 899(1); see also Broude et al., supra note 252, at
42 ("Also unlike in a CVA, where all creditors vote as part of a single class, creditors in a
Scheme will vote in separate classes of creditors holding common interests.").
278. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 899(1), (3) (discussing voting requirements).
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., William Underhill & Caroline Edwards, What MyTravel Means for
Bondholders: The Timeframe Imposed on the MyTravel Restructuring by Regulatory
Considerations Forced the Company to Take a Tough Line with Bondholders, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., Mar. 2005, at 33, 34.
281. See Telewest Global, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 99.1 (July 15, 2004)
(announcing that Telewest Communications plc had completed its financial restructuring).
282. The bondholders in Telewest disputed classification based on the conversion rate
applied to the bonds; the bondholders in MyTravel disputed the company's ability to
accomplish a reconstruction or scheme without classifying bondholders and giving them a
vote on the proposed plan. See, e.g., Underhill & Edwards, supra note 280, at 34-36 (same);
Fraser Hem, Courting Hope, LEGAL WK. (U.K.), Feb. 2, 2006, at 26 (describing bondholder
disputes in MyTravel and Telewest); Bondholders' Opposition to Schemes of Arrangement,
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debtholders. The MyTravel dispute was resolved consensually and the
Scheme was approved and implemented.283
iii. The Jarvis Approach
Finally, a company may implement a capital restructuring completely out
of court and without a CVA or Scheme. A company can achieve this type
of restructuring under general U.K. law with the cooperation of the
debtholders and the requisite consent of shareholders. 284 This type of
restructuring is limited in that it can only affect the rights of debtholders
who consent (or who have agreed to be bound by the consent of others
under the applicable debt documents). Accordingly, it typically is used in a
debt-for-equity exchange with a concentrated debtholder group.
Jarvis illustrates this type of restructuring. Jarvis worked closely with its
small group of senior debtholders to obtain a moratorium, additional
capital, and ultimately, a restructuring agreement. 285 For this reason, Jarvis
did not need to invoke an administration for a moratorium, or a CVA or
Scheme to bind its debtholders. The contemplated restructuring of a debt-
for-equity exchange simply required the approval of shareholders. This
approval was necessary because the exchange would substantially dilute the
shareholders' interests. The restructuring was presented to, and passed by,
shareholders as a resolution at an extraordinary meeting of creditors called
under the Companies Act 2006.286
c. Debtholders' Rights Under Prepackaged Restructurings
U.K. bankruptcy law does not explicitly facilitate a prepackaged
restructuring plan process. Nevertheless, troubled companies and their
debtholders are pursuing prepackaged plans as an alternative to simple
administrations and administrative receiverships. 287 This process allows
the parties to negotiate the sale of the company or substantially all of its
assets prior to initiating an administration. 288 The parties also agree upon
the individuals who will serve as administrators. The administrators then
implement the sale immediately upon commencement of the
administration. 289
283. See Underhill & Edwards, supra note 280, at 36; Hem, supra note 282;
Bondholders' Opposition to Schemes ofArrangement, supra note 282, at 4.
284. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 336-340; see also FINCH, supra note 144, at
229-31.
285. See supra Part II.C.
286. See JARVIS UNAUDITED RESULTS FOR 2005, supra note 108, at 1, 11-12; Completion
of Restructuring, supra note 120.
287. See generally Broude et al., supra note 252, at 40-43 (discussing use of prepackaged
administrations).
288. See id.
289. See id. In a prepackaged administration, the administrators still owe a duty to all
creditors. Thus, the administrators need to perform sufficient due diligence regarding the
company's affairs and the proposed sale to satisfy their duty. Some observers criticize the
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Distressed debt investor BlueBay Asset Management and several banks
used this prepackaged approach in The Polestar Group's restructuring. The
Polestar Group is one of Europe's largest independent printers.290 BlueBay
and the banks held Polestar's senior secured debt, in the amount of
approximately £375 million.291  They worked with the company to
implement a capital restructuring through a debt-for-equity exchange.
Specifically, the parties negotiated the sale of the senior debtholders'
collateral-i.e., substantially all of the company's assets-to a new
entity.2 92 The senior lenders agreed to write off approximately two-thirds
of their debt in exchange for the equity of the new company.293 Polestar's
junior debt of approximately £350 million and its existing equity, held by a
private equity firm, was wiped out.2 94 Polestar's underfunded pension plan
was closed, but Polestar agreed to contribute £45 million to the plan over a
twelve-year period.295  The asset sale was accomplished by an
administrative receiver immediately upon the commencement of an
administrative receivership by the senior lenders. 296 A similar prepackaged
approach works in the administration context as well. 297
prepackaged administration process for, among other things, lack of transparency. See, e.g.,
Carolyn Swain, Mind the Pre-pack, LAWYER (U.K.), July 3, 2006, at 32, 32.
290. Press Release, Polestar Group, supra note 15.
291. See, e.g., Nick Hassell, Polestar Investors Lose Millions, TIMES (London), Dec. 8,
2006, at 62 (explaining that Polestar's senior debtholders were "asked to write off two third
of their investment, or £250 million," which would have reduced their total outstanding debt
to approximately £125 million); Publishing Firm Once Owned by Maxwell Slashes Debts by
£550m, BIRMINGHAM POST (U.K.), Dec. 9, 2006, at 22, available at LEXIS, Birmingham
Post File; Grant Ringshaw, Printer to Write Off £3OOm, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 22,
2006, at 3.
292. See Sandy Shandro, Golden Oldies: How Traditional Insolvency Law Concepts Are
Invaluable in Restructuring, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2007, at 30, 30 ("The restructuring
plan that was adopted involved the sale of the group to a bank-owned Cayman investment
vehicle and its recapitalisation via a debt-for-equity swap and the provision of new monies to
the group so as to reduce its bank indebtedness by approximately US$1.4 billion.").
293. See supra note 291.
294. See supra note 291.
295. See, e.g., Richard Tett & Charles Magoffin, The Living Dead: How Pension
Trustees Have Become Active, Even Accepting Creative Solutions, in Major Restructurings,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2007, at 24, 25 ("After extensive discussions, a creative solution
was agreed whereby the Polestar pension scheme and deficit was transferred to a separate
SPV company ringfenced away from the Polestar Group .... In exchange, Polestar agreed to
pay the pension scheme a total of £45 million over 12 years."). '
296. See, e.g., Shandro, supra note 292, at 30-31; Receiver Key to Polestar Rejig,
PRINTWEEK (U.K.), Dec. 21, 2006, at 3.
297. Prepackaged administrations are feasible because, among other things, "the
administrator has the power to sell the company's business without court review of the sale
process or court approval of the sale." Broude et al., supra note 252, at 41. Troubled
companies and their debtholders are using this restructuring mechanism more frequently.
See, e.g., Costcutter Helps with Stocks as FreshXpress Takes Shape, GROCER (U.K.), July
28, 2007, at 4 ("FreshXpress purchased 56 Kwik Save stores in an £18m pre-pack
administration deal, earlier this month."); Precedent Set for Private Equity Restructuring,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 2007, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Private Equity Restructuring] (describing
Damovo prepackaged administration and explaining that "'this is the first time that European
holding companies have been placed in administration in England under the EC Regulation
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B. Objectives and Strategies ofActivist Distressed Debt Investors
Institutional investors have one primary and common objective-to make
money. Consequently, an institutional investor's decision to pursue an
activist distressed debt investing opportunity is an economic decision. It
turns on whether untapped or underutilized value exists at the distressed
company. This value may be hidden in real property, noncore assets,
operational improvements, or industry consolidation. 298 The economic
nature of the investment decision applies on both sides of the Atlantic.
Notably, not all distressed debt investors desire to influence corporate
affairs. 299 In fact, the number of known activist investors is relatively
small. 300 Nevertheless, these investors are flush with capital and can have a
significant impact on a distressed company's affairs. They can seek to
influence corporate affairs through board representation, management
changes, or a controlling ownership interest in the company.30' This
section analyzes each of these strategies and the ultimate objective of value
creation below.
1. Board and Management Control
Management frequently is the target of activist investors.30 2 Potential
conflicts between management and the investors drive this trend.
Management, or at least key members of management, and the investors
may have different goals for the company's operations and capital structure
and management compensation packages. Regardless of the exact conflict,
the result is the same. Top executives, typically the CEO and CFO, are
replaced either shortly before or during the restructuring process. 303
For example, management may want to avoid bankruptcy, which
distressed debt investors may view as advantageous or necessary.30 4
in order to implement a bondholder restructuring through a pre-packaged administration
sale' (quoting Stephen Peppiatt of Bingham McCutchen LLP)).
298. See infra Part III.B.2.
299. See supra Part I.B.
300. One report estimates approximately 170 U.S.-based distressed debt investors. See
ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 3; see also Hamer, supra note 8, at 88 (data
reporting that approximately 24% of respondents invest in distressed debt).
301. See Harer, supra note 8, at 84 (data reporting that, of those respondents who
invested in distressed debt and responded to the applicable question, approximately 65.5%
attempt to influence board or management decisions at the company).
302. See id. at 85 & n.71 (data reporting that, of those respondents who invest in
distressed debt, approximately 29% attempt to influence management personnel changes and
approximately 24% attempt to influence management compensation changes).
303. See id. at 86 & n.76 (data reporting that, of those respondents who invest in
distressed debt, approximately 29% attempt to influence management personnel changes and
approximately 37% attempt to replace certain key members of management in efforts to
acquire control of the company).
304. Calpine Corp., one of the United States' largest owners of natural gas-fired power
plants, is a good example of this type of conflict. Calpine's bondholders disagreed with the
CEO and CFO's operation of the company. The bondholders thus froze approximately $400
million in escrow and forced litigation over the escrow and related operational issues, which
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Alternatively, management may disagree with a debt investor's
restructuring goals or timeline for the company. In Kmart, the CEO was
openly skeptical about the restructuring timeline proposed by ESL and
Third Avenue. 305 The CEO believed that Kmart should take its time in
bankruptcy to fix operational problems. He was quoted as saying, "You
need to emerge with the right capital structure, and with enough capital to
fix the business and ensure [vendor] support, ... [i]f you don't, then you
could end up back in bankruptcy." 30 6 ESL and Third Avenue, on the other
hand, pursued a quick emergence. Kmart emerged from bankruptcy on the
debtholders' timeline and with a new CEO at the helm. 30 7
Several other factors may result in a management change. Management
may be viewed by the activist investor and others as being part of the
problem that triggered the company's financial distress. The distressed debt
investor also may want its own designee in a leadership position. For
example, in Jarvis, the Royal Bank of Scotland encouraged an individual
from a prior deal relationship to accept the CEO position.30 8 In Allied,
Yucaipa appointed a new CEO in connection with the company's
emergence from Chapter 11 309
In addition, a distressed debt investor may seek representation on the
board of directors.3 10 Such representation assists the investor in influencing
ultimately triggered the CEO and CFO's resignation and Calpine's Chapter 11 case. See
Disclosure Statement for Debtors' Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter II of
the United States Bankruptcy Code at 13-14, 53, In re Calpine Corp., No. 05-60200(BRL),
2007 WL 4565223 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2007) (Docket No. 5016); Affidavit of Eric N.
Pryor Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, at 3-4, 42, Calpine, No. 05-60200(BRL)
(Dec. 21, 2005) (Docket No. 2); see also Roane, supra note 39, at 39 (noting hedge funds'
role in management's resignation and the company's bankruptcy filing); Jim Polson &
Bradley Keoun, Calpine Executives Ousted as Bankruptcy May Be Near, BLOOMBERG, Nov.
29, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aPn9hGDV3YiM&
refer-us (noting that the CEO and CFO of Calpine .'were the primary drivers keeping the
company out of bankruptcy for the past three years' (quoting Jeffrey Wolinsky, Standard &
Poor's)).
305. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 46, at 101-02.
306. Id. at 101.
307. See, e.g., Mitchell Pacelle & Amy Merrick, Salvage Operation: Behind Kmart Exit
from Chapter 11: Investor's Big Bet-As Debt He Held Lost Value, Mr. Lampert Forced
Out CEO, Pushed Up Timetable-Still Facing Wal-Mart, Target, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2003,
at Al ("[Lampert's solution for Kmart was to] [g]et the company out of bankruptcy court
fast. Mr. Adamson said he would do his best to accelerate events,... [b]ut Mr. Lampert was
already losing confidence in the Kmart chief. And within weeks, he made his decision
known: Management had to change."); see also Kmart Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 77-78 (Mar. 24, 2003) (describing former CEO James Adamson's resignation from, and
severance agreement with, Kmart).
308. See, e.g., Waples, supra note 109 ("[Lovell] was encouraged to take the post by
Royal Bank of Scotland, one of the lead creditors at Jarvis and a former lender to both
Costain and Dunlop Slazenger.").
309. See Allied Plan, supra note 176, at 42; Allied Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form
8-K) (May 25, 2007).
310. See Hamer, supra note 8, at 87-88 (data reporting that, of those respondents who
invest in distressed debt and responded to applicable question, approximately 43% seek
control of the board of directors at least 1% of the time, with approximately 16% doing so
more than 50% of the time).
2008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
management, operational, and capital changes at the company. Some
investors try to obtain this representation prior to any restructuring. For
example, in Radnor, Tennenbaum obtained a seat on the company's board
prior to the Chapter 11 case. 311 This prerestructuring representation does
not necessarily allow the investor to direct company action;312 however, it
does provide the investor with nonpublic information and a direct line of
communication to the decision-making body at the company.
Most distressed debt investors seek board representation in the
restructured company. This representation may be explicit in the terms of
the restructuring itself. For example, in Schefenacker, the agreement
among the senior debtholders, the company, and Dr. Shefenacker provided
for a five-member board. 313  During the first three years after
implementation of the agreement, Dr. Schefenacker could appoint one
director and, of the four largest shareholders, each could appoint one of the
remaining four directors. 314 Thereafter, the three largest shareholders could
each appoint one director and the remaining two directors would be
appointed by ordinary resolution of the shareholders. 315
2. Ownership Changes
Some activist investors want control of the entire company, rather than
just a few isolated management decisions.316 This type of control can be
achieved to some extent through board representation. The activist
investor's control is strengthened significantly, however, if the investor uses
311. See In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 BR. 820, 829-30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(explaining prepetition relationship between debtors and Tennenbaum).
312. An investor's representative must be mindful of its fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
corporation. See id. at 844-45 (explaining that Tennenbaum's representative acted
appropriately by abstaining from certain votes).
313. Schefenacker CVA, supra note 87, at 105.
314. Id.
315. Id. Similar explicit provisions were included in the Allied and Kmart plans of
reorganization. See Allied Plan, supra note 176, at 42 (Yucaipa received the right to appoint
four of five postpetition board members); First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of
Kmart Corporation and Its Affiliated Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession, supra note 126, at
35 (ESL and Third Avenue received the right to appoint four of nine postpetition board
members).
316. An increasing operational play for activist investors in Europe is to encourage the
company to relocate its country of incorporation (or centre of main interests) to a country
that is viewed as more creditor-friendly. See supra Part II.B (discussion of Schefenacker);
see also Ken Baird & Paul Sidle, Insolvency: Flitting Boom, LAWYER (U.K.), July 2, 2007,
at 29, 29 (describing the move of Deutsche Nickel and Schefenacker's country of
incorporation from Germany to the United Kingdom); Private Equity Restructuring, supra
note 297, at 8 (describing the move of Damovo's country of incorporation from Luxembourg
to the United Kingdom). The location of a company's centre of main interest is important
under the European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings because it determines
jurisdiction in conflict of law situations. See, e.g., Broude et al., supra note 252, at 39-40.
This migration of distressed companies from one country to another is similar to the forum
shopping that may take place in connection with a company's Chapter 11 filing in the United
States.
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its influence over management or the board to acquire a controlling or
majority ownership interest in the company.
Acquiring an ownership interest often is a subobjective of activist
investors. 317  These investors invest in troubled companies with the
intention of forcing a debt-for-equity exchange. In the United States, this
type of restructuring is most frequently accomplished through a traditional
Chapter 11 plan, as in Allied and Kmart, or a prenegotiated plan, as in
Granite Broadcasting Corporation. 318  An out-of-court debt-for-equity
exchange generally is not an option for large public companies in the
United States. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a public company
such as Jarvis may accomplish a complex debt-for-equity exchange with
little or no substantive court involvement. 31 9
Once in control, the activist investor can unlock the value that initially
drew the investor to the troubled company. In Kmart, part of this value was
the company's substantial real estate holdings. Shortly after Kmart's
emergence from Chapter 11, Kmart sold a portion of this real estate to Sears
and Home Depot for approximately $900 million. 320 This move, together
with cost reductions and other operational changes, significantly increased
Kmart's stock value. A similar strategy was used by distressed debt
investors in the Chapter 11 cases of Loews Cineplex and Regal
Entertainment Group. The investors in both cases realized a substantial
profit from their postbankruptcy ownership positions.32'
An activist investor also may be looking to consolidate its holdings or
create synergy in a particular industry. This appears to be the case in
Allied, where Yucaipa now controls over 50% of the U.S. vehicle-
transporter market. 322 Distressed debt investors pursued a similar strategy
with U.K. cable operators NTL Inc. and Telewest. The investors acquired
317. See Harner, supra note 8, at 85 (data reporting that, of those respondents who invest
in distressed debt and responded to the applicable question, approximately 40% attempt to
acquire a controlling ownership interest in the company at least 1% of the time); see also
DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2008, supra note 54, at 16 (reporting that "there was a
pick up of direct lending to distressed issuers in 2007, particularly those issuers linked to
commodities or the housing downturn"); DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET OUTLOOK 2007, supra
note 54, at 20 ("Only 20% of respondents said they would never pursue such a strategy,
while over 40% said lending into situations for equity control was either part of their core
strategy or a course of action they would consider on an exceptional basis in 2007.").
318. See supra Part III.A. 1 .a.i, c.
319. See supra Part III.A.2.b.iii.
320. See, e.g., Matt Miller, The Property Play, DAILY DEAL, May 26, 2006 (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) ("In 2004 [after emerging from bankruptcy], Kmart booked more
than $1 billion through property sales, primarily to Home Depot and Sears. The retailer
ended its year with a $1.1 billion profit.").
321. See, e.g., Lauria & Holman, supra note 14 (explaining that distressed debt investors
who acquired Loews through a debt-for-equity exchange made a substantial profit on
subsequent sale of Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corp. (Loews) to private equity buyers;
one such investor reportedly made over $200 million on the sale); Morris, supra note 14
(explaining that distressed debt investors who acquired Regal Entertainment Group through
a debt-for-equity exchange realized, in one instance, sevenfold gain through special
dividends and other value appreciation).
322. See supra Part I.A.
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the equity of NTL and Telewest through their respective restructuring plans
with the stated intention of merging the two companies after the
restructurings were complete. 323
Regardless of how an investor chooses to operate the troubled company
after the debt-for-equity exchange, few investors maintain this investment
for more than one to three years. 324 Rather, most investors look to realize
gain on their distressed debt investments through an initial public offering
or private sale of the equity. 32 5 This investment reality raises the question
of whether distressed debt investors are really improving the long-term
value of the company or just the short-term liquidity of their holdings.
3. Value Creation (or Destruction)
Activist investors seek to make their money by enhancing or creating
value at the company. 326 The concept of value creation in this context,
however, can be deceiving. What is seen as value enhancing to the investor
can be value destructive to the company on either a pre- or postrestructuring
basis.327
The issue of value creation or destruction is present in both U.S. and
U.K. restructurings and is most troubling in the prerestructuring context.
During this period, the solvency of the company may still be in question,
and both creditors junior to the distressed debt investors and existing
shareholders may still have some interest in the company. 328 This scenario
places the company's management in a delicate position. Management
must fulfill its fiduciary duties, which may still be owed exclusively or at
323. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 15 (explaining contemplated merger of NTL and
Telewest upon completion of debt-for-equity exchange and noting that analysts argue a
merger of Telewest and NTL would create a company better able to take on the United
Kingdom's dominant pay-TV operator BSkyB).
324. See Hamer, supra note 8, at 83 tbl.2 (data reporting that, of those respondents who
invest in distressed debt and responded to the applicable question, approximately only 13%
were willing to maintain an equity investment longer than three years, with approximately
58% wanting to be out of the investment in one to three years); see also ALTMAN &
SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D; LHABITANT, supra note 22, at 100; ROSENBERG,
supra note 22, at 29-33.
325. See ALTMAN & SWANSON, supra note 26, at 25 app. D; ROSENBERG, supra note 22,
at 29-33; Hamer, supra note 8, at 83 tbl.2; see also Houghton, supra note 35 (noting IPO as
an exit strategy for distressed debt investors). The investors in Loews used the private sale
vehicle to realize gain on their investment. See, e.g., Lauria & Holman, supra note 14
(explaining that distressed debt investors who acquired Loews through a debt-for-equity
exchange made a substantial profit on subsequent sale of Loews to private equity buyers).
326. See supra Part 1.B (discussing investment strategies).
327. See, e.g., Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 17, at 1034-35 (explaining, in the context of
the Tower Automotive Chapter 11 cases, how hedge funds and other distressed lenders may
have incentive to destroy, rather than create, corporate value).
328. Directors generally owe their fiduciary duties to the company and the shareholders,
as the residual owners of the company. If a company is almost, but not completely,
insolvent (often referred to as the "zone of insolvency"), the directors may still owe duties to
shareholders. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 170 (Eng.) (directors owe duties to the
company); see also id. §§ 171-177 (detailing directors' duties).
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least partially to the company's shareholders. 329 Yet management is facing
demands from a controlling debtholder that may end up owning the
company at the end of the restructuring. 33 0
Conflicts between management, the controlling debtholder, other
debtholders, and existing shareholders can be value destructive. Some
observers in the United States believe that activist investors can add delay
and expense to the restructuring process. 331 This type of conduct in turn
reduces distributions to junior creditors and any likelihood that shareholders
can maintain their interests. It also can cause the company to run out of
money before a restructuring plan is approved.
American Remanufacturers, Inc. is an example of conflicts leading to a
loss of value for the company and its stakeholders. American
Remanufacturers filed a Chapter 1 1 case in November 2005.332
Simultaneously with its case filing, American Remanufacturers sought
bankruptcy court approval of a DIP Loan from its prepetition senior lender,
Black Diamond. The DIP Loan contemplated $31 million in credit and a
quick sale of the company's assets to Black Diamond for approximately
$32 million.333 Two of American Manufacturer's junior debtholders, DDJ
Capital Management LLC and Airlie Opportunity Master Fund, Ltd.,
objected to the DIP Loan and proposed their own financing package and
stand-alone restructuring plan for the company. 334 Before the dispute could
329. See infra note 370.
330. For a discussion of management fiduciary duties, see infra Part III.C.4.
331. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 22, at 32, 89-91, 99 (noting that "to some
[investors], ... blocking tactics lengthened the bankruptcy process," and describing several
cases where such delay materialized, including Coleco Industries and Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corporation); see also Roane, supra note 39, at 38-39 (noting that the distressed debt
investors dispute in the FiberMark Chapter 11 case cost "about $60 million over the course
of seven months").
332. Motion for Order Authorizing and Approving (A) An Asset Purchase Agreement
Subject to Higher and Better Offers, (B) Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets,
Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests, (C) Assumption and
Assignment of Certain Executory Contracts, (D) Assumption of Certain Liabilities, and (E)
Granting Related Relief at 3, In re Am. Remfrs, Inc., No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del.
Nov. 7, 2005) (Docket No. 17) [hereinafter Am. Remfrs. Original Sale Motion].
333. Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 361, 363 and 364 of the Bankruptcy Code
(1) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing the Use of
Cash Collateral, (3) Authorizing Repayment of Certain Prepetition Secured Debt, (4)
Granting Liens and Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (5) Providing Adequate
Protection and (6) Scheduling and Approving the Form and Method of Notice of Final
Hearing at 7, Am. Remfrs., No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Docket No. 14) (describing maximum
borrowing amount under DIP Loan as $31 million); Am. Remfrs. Original Sale Motion,
supra note 332, at 9 (describing the purchase price as amounts outstanding under the DIP
Loan, plus $1.1 million).
334. Objection of DDJ Capital Management, LLC and Arlie Opportunity Master Fund
Ltd. to the Debtors' Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 361, 363 and 364 of the
Bankruptcy Code (1) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Financing, (2)
Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Authorizing Repayment of Certain Prepetition
Secured Debt, (4) Granting Liens and Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (5)
Providing Adequate Protection and (6) Scheduling and Approving the Form and Method of
Notice of Final Hearing, Am. Remfrs., No. 05-20022 (PJW) (Nov. 9, 2005) (Docket No. 26).
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be resolved, the company converted its case to a Chapter 7 case, and a
Chapter 7 trustee was appointed.335 A member of the senior bank group
purchased the company's inventory assets at a fire sale for $7.7 million. 336
Not every distressed investment situation leads to conflict, and,
regardless, distressed debt investors may be the only or best source of
rescue capital for the company. 337 A distressed debt investor that offers
new capital to the restructured company, either directly or by improving the
company's balance sheet through a debt-for-equity exchange, can give a
troubled company a second chance. These investors can create value by
deleveraging the company's balance sheet and instituting operational
changes, as was accomplished in Kmart, Loews, Regal Cinema, Jarvis, and
other cases discussed above.
Activist investors also can create value by influencing changes at the
company that make the company more attractive to potential buyers, which
may be either the investors themselves or third parties.338 A sale of the
company or its assets on a going-concern basis can enhance the productivity
of the company's assets, including its personnel. Werner and Polestar
demonstrate how asset sales to distressed debt investors can create a
recovery pool for other creditors and continue the utility of the company's
assets. In both cases, business operations continued, employees retained
their jobs, and some value was created for junior creditors in Werner and
pension beneficiaries in Polestar. 339 Bally Total Fitness demonstrates how
335. See Am. Remfrs., No. 05-20022 (PJW), slip op. at 2 (Nov. 17, 2005) (Docket No. 88)
(converting Chapter 11 cases to Chapter 7 cases); see also Peress & Prinzhorn, supra note
199, at 57 ("After four days of confusing disputes about definitions of third parties, priming
and subordination, the company lawyers informed the court that the company had run out of
cash and converted to a chapter 7 liquidation."); FITCH RATINGS, A CASE STUDY APPROACH
TO U.S. SECOND-LIEN LEVERAGED LOAN RECOVERY EXPECTATIONS 5 (2007) [hereinafter A
CASE STUDY APPROACH], available at http://fitchratings.com (subscription required, on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
336. See A CASE STUDY APPROACH, supra note 335, at 5 ("A member of the company's
senior lender group subsequently purchased the company's inventory assets at a fire sale for
$7.7 million.").
337. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 153, 183 (2004) (noting that "a single investor or a single group of investors
[including hedge funds and other distressed debt investors] may amass funds to purchase an
entire firm (or its assets) at costs that may exceed $1 billion, thus removing risk of potential
losses due to dismemberment of the firm (or its assets) and the increased costs associated
with breakups"); Yap, supra note 165, at 158-61 (suggesting that distressed debt investors
add corporate value through offering otherwise unavailable financing and monitoring
management).
338. This technique involves the creation of a new company to serve as an acquisition
vehicle. The new company is owned by the distressed debt investors, who can, among other
things, contribute their debt holdings to the company for purposes of credit bidding. For an
example of this technique in practice, see Werner Sale Motion, supra note 203, at 1-4, 6-11,
which describes the structure of a sale facilitated by a new acquisition company.
339. See, e.g., Roknick, supra note 203 (noting that the "[t]erms of the [Werner] sale also
call for the retention of managers and employees" and that unsecured creditors reached a
deal with the company and purchasers whereby they would receive "a piece of proceeds
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investors can help position the company for a sale to a third party at a
higher price. 340
Whether rescues by distressed debt investors result in long-term value for
the company is uncertain. Commentators have different views on this issue,
and it is one of the primary critiques of distressed debt investments. 341 The
issue stems partly from the conflicts discussed above and partly from the
investment horizons of distressed debt investors. 342 Even an investor with a
long-term investment horizon generally desires to be out of the investment
within one to three years. 343 In contrast, the company desires to be in
business and profitable beyond that time frame. 344
Activist distressed debt investing is not a perfect solution to a company's
financial troubles, but it is a solution. Institutional investors also are
from lawsuits that will emerge under a reorganization plan"); Tett & Magoffin, supra note
295 (describing value created for Polestar pension beneficiaries).
340. Bally Total Fitness originally filed a prepackaged plan of reorganization in its
Chapter 11 case that contemplated a debt-for-equity exchange with its distressed debt
investors. Subsequently, Bally Total Fitness received and accepted an offer for the company
that exceeded the value of the original plan and even provided a small return to existing
equity holders. See Bally Motion to Modify, supra note 224, at 8-12.
341. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 10, at 1245-46 (noting that "[t]he crucial
question is the extent to which private lenders' self-interest is aligned with the interests of all
the investors in the corporation" and answering this question with cautious optimism); see
also Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 820-22 & n.22 (2006) (noting issue of
short-termism with respect to institutional investors such as hedge funds). For a discussion
of the general debate regarding value creation and institutional investors such as hedge
funds, see Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:
An Empirical Analysis, 32 IOWA J. CORP. L. 681, 682-84 (2007), and Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083-87 (2007).
342. See Fuller, supra note 31, at 17 (explaining the conflicts that may arise in the
distressed debt investing context, including a "divergence in time horizons when determining
a value realisation").
343. See supra note 324.
344. The long-term value creation issue is less troubling on the back end of restructurings
involving debt-for-equity exchanges. Distressed debt investors, as owners of the reorganized
company, should invest efficiently in positive net present value transactions, meaning that
surplus cash is distributed to shareholders, including the investor. See, e.g., Mihn Van Ngo,
Agency Costs and the Demand and Supply of Secured Debt and Asset Securitization, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 413, 422 (2002) ("In order to maximize returns, shareholders desire that
managers invest corporate funds in all available positive net present value projects."); see
also E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., The Divergence of Corporate Finance and Law in Corporate
Governance, 46 S.C. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1995) ("The basic finance theory that managers
should maximize the value of the corporation by investing in all positive net present value
projects serves the dual purpose of maximizing the value of the corporation and the wealth
of shareholders."). This efficient investing strategy is in contrast to that sometimes pursued
by management, where "managers have an incentive to retain an extra amount of cash
beyond levels necessary to fund positive net present value projects" and invest it in negative
net present value projects. See, e.g., Ngo, supra, at 422-23. This strategy also should
provide at least short-term value to other stakeholders. Those stakeholders must then assess
whether this strategy causes the company to pass over long-term growth opportunities to
their detriment. Cf Lashbrooke, supra, at 450 (providing other examples and explanations
for managers passing over positive net present value opportunities).
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pursuing the strategy with more vigor as an independent, alternative means
of influencing corporate affairs. Companies and other stakeholders thus
must understand the strategy and how it is changing the corporate
restructuring landscape.
C. Distressed Debt as a Catalyst for Convergence in U.S. and UK.
Restructurings
Distressed debt investors in both the United States and the United
Kingdom have the opportunity to fill, and can accomplish similar objectives
in, an activist role. As discussed above, activist investors can influence
management decisions, trigger management personnel changes, and acquire
control of the company. This activism is changing the way companies
approach and react in restructuring contexts. It also is changing the
traditional roles of management, trustees, and debtholders in U.S. and U.K.
restructurings.
1. U.S. Exportation of Distressed Debt Investing
Distressed debt investing first took hold in the United States. It began as
a small, niche market primarily used by hedge funds that often were (and
still are to some extent) called "vulture" investors. 345 The nickname refers
to these investors' perceived practice of scavenging company carcasses for
value. The market itself prospered under the U.S. Chapter 11 process,
which allows parties to buy and trade claims against bankrupt
companies. 346 Investors quickly realized the potential value in the claims
trading market.
Distressed debt investing has since developed into an investment strategy
independent of Chapter 11 that focuses on a much broader pool of troubled
companies and distressed debt instruments. It also has expanded beyond
U.S. borders. 347  The overseas restructuring processes, however,
traditionally are very different from the U.S. process. Distressed debt
investors thus either had to change their investment objectives or change the
345. See, e.g., Rich Pickings, supra note 43, at 20 ("Vultures are basically value investors,
trying to buy an asset for a price well below its intrinsic or fair value.").
346. For a discussion of claims trading, see supra Part I.A. 1.
347. See, e.g., Beverini & Cova, supra note 58 (noting move of U.S. funds into European
markets); Tett, supra note 45 (same); see also Fuller, supra note 31, at 15 (noting U.S.
influence on European distressed debt market). "There is now more than $1.1 [trillion]
(f579 [billion]) worldwide under hedge fund management, with London at the centre of
Europe's hedge fund management industry, responsible for approximately two-thirds of the
$325 [billion] (f171 [billion]) in funds under management in Europe." Houghton, supra note
35, at 28; see also Edward I. Altman & William Stonberg, The Market in Defaulted Bonds
and Bank Loans: 2005 Review and 2006 Predictions, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 2006,
at 93, 94 ("We know of 160 distressed debt investors. At least two dozen operate outside of
the United States, and another 10-15 European-based investors who do not have a U.S.
operation."); Rich Pickings, supra note 43, at 22 ("Analysts say Europe still lags behind
America in the opportunities it provides for distressed debt investors, but that this situation is
changing as its high-yield corporate bond market and national insolvency laws evolve.").
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restructuring processes. The latter appears to be occurring in both the
United States and the United Kingdom.
2. Convergence in U.S. and U.K. Restructuring Processes
U.S. and U.K. bankruptcy laws "on the books" are different in many
respects. Both countries now offer a reorganization alternative that focuses
on rescuing troubled companies. 348 Nevertheless, the mechanics of each
country's reorganization laws differ in several key respects. 349  For
example, management stays in place in Chapter 11, but is displaced in an
administration. The Chapter 11 automatic stay generally prohibits the
termination of prebankruptcy contracts, but the U.K. moratorium does not.
Moreover, the DIP Loan structure in the United States has no identical
counterpart in the U.K. administration process.
Based on these and other statutory differences, U.S. bankruptcy law
generally is viewed as more debtor-oriented, and U.K. law is viewed as
more creditor-oriented. The concepts of a debtor-in-possession and
management staying in place in Chapter 11 cause the U.S. process to be
characterized as management-driven. 350  The appointment of an
administrator under administration causes the U.K. process to be
characterized as management-displacing. 351 As is often the case, however,
the law on the books does not necessarily reflect the law in practice.
The presence of an activist investor can change the restructuring
landscape and the application of bankruptcy law. In the United States,
management may continue to operate the company as a debtor-in-
possession and may continue to have an exclusive opportunity to propose a
plan of reorganization. These factors, however, do not mean that
management has control of the restructuring process or the development of
the restructuring plan.352  Likewise, in the United Kingdom, an
administrator may receive all of the powers of management upon the
commencement of the administration. The management team, however,
typically remains in place, and the administrator relies on management to
exercise its powers. 353  The administrator's powers may be further
348. For a discussion of Chapter 11 and administration, see supra Part W.A.
349. See supra Part III.A.
350. See Armour et al., supra note 21, at 1727-28.
351. See id. at 1735-36, 1745-46, 1761-62.
352. Management turnover in connection with a Chapter I I case is not a new
development. Lenders (primarily banks) have long had the ability through their financing
contracts and general influence over the debtor to cause the board of directors to replace the
debtor's CEO. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at 937-39. The successor CEO
and the board, however, traditionally were then permitted to retain control of the debtor's
business and restructuring. Activist investors typically are not willing to leave either
historical or new management with this type of control.
353. See, e.g., Broude et al., supra note 252, at 41 ("Under a court approved protocol, it is
possible that the administrator may leave much of the day-to-day management decisions to
existing management under the administrator's supervision .... ").
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diminished by the desires of a distressed debt investor, particularly in the
prepackaged administration context.
Activist investors are using both the U.S. and the U.K. restructuring
processes to influence the affairs of troubled companies. They have
identified opportunities under the laws of both countries to effect the same
end. Their focus on this common end-i.e., obtaining control in distressed
situations-has pushed the restructuring practice in both the United States
and the United Kingdom toward a more "management-neutral" process.
3. The Common Theme of Management Neutrality
The word "neutral" is commonly defined as "impartial;... indistinct;
indeterminate." 354 It conveys a notion of an unbiased and unobtrusive
observer. It also accurately describes the general posture of management in
corporate restructurings when distressed debt investors are present. 355
Activist investors rarely replace the entire board or management team of
a company at the start of a restructuring. 356 These investors frequently need
the expertise of existing management to assist in the operation of the
business and the implementation of a turnaround plan. For this reason,
management remains in place. This basic premise applies regardless of
whether the company files a Chapter 11 case or an administration.
Activist investors, however, do not hesitate to encourage a top-level
management change if they consider it necessary to create value.357 The
boards and management of troubled companies are well aware of this fact.
Consequently, management staying in place does not necessarily equate to
management staying in charge. Management often is relegated to a
supporting role in restructurings with distressed debt investors.
Casting management in a supporting role suggests that someone else is
leading the restructuring. The most likely candidate for this leadership role
354. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 530 (1999).
355. This Article uses the term "management" to mean historical management, as
opposed to restructuring professionals placed on the management team in a CRO or CFO
capacity. A restructuring professional does not face the same pressures as historical
management, who has a history and presumably wants a future with the company.
Restructuring professionals also are typically placed on the management team at the behest
of, or to appease, lenders and distressed debt investors.
356. Typically, distressed debt investors will encourage only a change at the CEO level or
the engagement of an outside restructuring professional as CRO or CFO at the beginning of
a restructuring. See, e.g., supra Part II (discussing case studies); see also Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 30, 2007) (announcing change in top
management approximately one month before announcement of restructuring deal with
debtholders); Quinn, supra note 15 (noting change in Damovo's chairman of the board in
connection with restructuring). Alternatively, as in Gate Gourmet, distressed debt investors
may not seek any change in top management. Press Release, Gate Gourmet, Gate Gourmet
Names David N. Siegel Chairman and CEO (June 8, 2004), available at
http://www.gategourmet.com/about/pressreleases/2004/pr_2004_0608_seigelannouncement.html
(noting that Mr. Siegel remained with Gate Gourmet throughout the restructuring announced
in 2005 and thereafter).
357. See supra note 303.
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is the distressed debt investor. Activist investors seek to fill this leadership
role and to take charge of the restructuring process. They frequently work
with their own restructuring professionals to design rescue plans and bring
the necessary parties to the negotiating table.
As a result, a process is emerging in which distressed debt investors and
the company's other stakeholders, including junior creditors, shareholders,
labor unions, and major contract parties, negotiate (or fight about) the
company's restructuring plan. 358 The distressed debt investor typically has
the most leverage and controls the key terms of the company's
reorganization. Other stakeholders influence the allocation of distributions
and may obtain a minority stake in the reorganized company. Management
for the most part listens and reacts to the restructuring proposals and at most
may try to mediate disputes among the stakeholders. Management rarely is
the party designing and insisting on a particular restructuring plan.
In Allied, this process played out as a negotiation among the company,
Yucaipa, and the Teamsters. The company eventually dropped out of the
picture, and the distressed debt investor emerged to complete the
restructuring negotiations with the Teamsters, the creditors' committee, and
then members of the company's management team. 359 Yucaipa ended up
owning the company and obtaining a modified labor contract. The
Teamsters received the right to approve the company's new CEO and to
observe the conduct of the company's board. 360 The creditors' committee
received the right to appoint one of the four members of the company's
board.361 Yucaipa also entered into amended and restated employment
agreements with certain members of management, including the company's
CFO and General Counsel. 362
The Schefenacker restructuring involved a similar process. The primary
parties around the Schefenacker negotiating table were the company's
senior debtholders, its controlling shareholder, and its major customers, i.e.,
certain original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the automotive
industry.363 The parties worked together to determine short- and long-term
funding sources for the company, the treatment of claims and interests held
by junior creditors and shareholders, and the revised terms of the
company's supply contracts with the OEMs. They also determined the
allocation of ownership in the reorganized company. The senior
debtholders received a controlling ownership interest, Dr. Schefenacker
received approximately a 20% interest, and the OEMs received
358. This process, described herein as a management-neutral process, also could be
described as a creditor-controlled process. However, this Article uses the term management-
neutral process to highlight the changing role of management in corporate restructurings.
This term is more illustrative of potential issues with the emerging process given
management's role as the company's agent and its corresponding fiduciary duties.
359. See supra Part II.A (discussion of Allied restructuring).
360. See supra Part II.A.
361. See supra Part II.A.
362. See supra Part II.A.
363. See supra Part II.B (discussion of Schefenacker restructuring).
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approximately a 10% economic interest (giving them the right to receive
that percentage of any dividend, distribution, or return on the company's
equity). 364
This theme of management neutrality similarly is present in other
corporate restructurings. The Kmart restructuring turned largely on the
ability of ESL and Third Avenue to broker a settlement among the
prepetition facility lenders, prepetition bondholders, and the trade creditors'
committee. 365 The Jarvis restructuring required significant oversight by the
company's banks and the intervention of a CRO to facilitate the sale of the
company's tube line operations and a comprehensive settlement of the
company's contingent construction project liabilities. It also involved a
new capital structure designed largely by distressed debt investors.366
The terms "management neutrality" and "management-neutral process"
as used here do not imply an absent or inactive management team. To the
contrary, management may be quite active in a management-neutral
restructuring. Management often is the primary source of the relationships
and expertise necessary to facilitate and implement the company's
restructuring plans. Consequently, management typically is present at the
negotiating table and adds value to the process. But management generally
does not control the process.
The convergence of U.S. and U.K. restructuring processes toward a more
management-neutral process is a general observation. There will, of course,
be varying degrees of management neutrality and exceptions to the general
observation in individual cases. Nevertheless, the general pattern of
364. See supra Part II.B.
365. See supra Part II.D (discussion of Kmart restructuring). Other examples in the
United States include the restructurings of Bally Total Fitness and Dana Corporation. In
Bally Total Fitness, the company's senior noteholders and subordinated noteholders, led by
"Anschutz Investment Company, Goldman Sachs & Co. and funds advised by Tennenbaum
Capital Partners, LLC," entered into extensive restructuring negotiations. Bally Disclosure
Statement, supra note 224, at 18-19, 29; see also Stephen Taub, Bally Aims for Chapter-11
Fitness, CFO.coM, June 4, 2007, http://www.cfo.comlarticle.cfm/9281617?f=-search. In
Dana, hedge fund Centerbridge Capital Partners, L.P., two of the company's labor unions,
and an ad hoc committee of the company's four largest debtholders negotiated an investment
agreement that largely dictated the terms of the company's restructuring plan. See, e.g., Dana
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 31, 2007); see also Appaloosa Says Dana Pact Is
Flawed, BOSTON.COM, July 24, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/business/articles/
2007/07/24/appaloosa says-dana-pact is flawed/ (explaining the terms of the investment
agreement and shareholders' criticism of same).
366. See supra Part II.C. Other examples in the United Kingdom include Damovo and
Gate Gourmet. In Damovo, distressed debt investors purchased a majority of the company's
bonds when they dropped in value. See Quinn, supra note 15. They then negotiated a
restructuring plan that included exchanging £240 million in bonds for a majority ownership
position in the company. See id.; see also Guy Dixon, Damovo to Retain Glasgow HQ as
Creditors Move In, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, Dec. 24, 2006, at Business 1, available at
http://business.scotsman.com/energyutilities/Damovo-to-retain-Glasgow-HQ.28378I0.jp. In
Gate Gourmet, distressed debt investors purchased the company's mezzanine debt and then
negotiated a majority ownership position in the restructured company. See Houghton, supra
note 35; Heather Timmons, Big Airline Catering Service Faces Trouble at Every Turn, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at C7.
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restructurings involving distressed debt investors evidences strong
management-neutral tendencies, and these tendencies represent a change
from the historical restructuring processes under U.S. and U.K. laws.
4. Management Neutrality and Management Fiduciary Duties
The development of a management-neutral restructuring process raises
potential corporate governance issues under U.S. and U.K. law. In both
countries, directors and officers act as fiduciaries for the company.3 67 In
the United States, these duties are owed primarily to shareholders when the
company is solvent.368 When the company is insolvent, directors' and
officers' fiduciary duties are owed to creditors. 369 When solvency is
questionable, the beneficiary of directors' and officers' duties is less clear.
In general, management is said to owe duties to the entire corporate
enterprise. 370
367. With respect to U.K. law, see Companies Act, 2006, ch. 46, § 170 (Eng.) (U.K.
directors owe duties to the company). See also id. §§ 171-177 (detailing U.K. directors'
duties); 7(2) LORD MACKAY OF CLABTERN, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1083 (4th ed.
2004) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND] ("The directors of a company owe a
fiduciary duty to act bona fide in what they consider to be the interests of the company (and
not for any collateral purpose); and to make full and honest disclosure to the shareholders
before they vote on a resolution."). With respect to U.S. law, see N. Am. Catholic Edu.
Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) ("It is well settled
that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation."). See also Floyd v. Hefner, No. H-03-
5693, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70922, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that officers
and directors generally owe duties to the corporation). In both the United States and the
United Kingdom, officers generally are held to the same fiduciary standard as directors. See
Donovan Waters, Property Management Concepts and the Entity Trust in the Common Law
Setting, J. INT'L TRUST & CORP. PLANNING, June 2007, at 73, 78 (discussing general
corporate law principles in common law countries, including the United States and the
United Kingdom, and noting that "there is [a] fiduciary obligation that attaches to both
directors and executives vis-i-vis the corporation"); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David
Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1597,
1610-11 (2005) (arguing for a more detailed and thoughtful analysis of officers' fiduciary
duties and noting that "although officers and directors occupy distinctive roles in corporate
governance, most corporate law authority uncritically obliterates that distinction when it
comes to fiduciary duties").
368. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Republic Bank & Trust Co., No. 06 Civ. 185 (HB), 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 503, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2007) (noting that "management owes a fiduciary
duty to its shareholders"); see also N. Am. Catholic, 930 A.2d at 97-99. In the United
Kingdom, "[i]n general, directors do not, solely by virtue of the office of director, owe
fiduciary duties to shareholders, collectively or individually." HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND, supra note 367, § 1083.
369. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic, 930 A.2d at 101 ("When a corporation is insolvent,
however, its creditors take the place of the shareholders as the residual beneficiaries of any
increase in value."); see also HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 367, § 1083 ("The
directors' obligation to act ... in the interests of the company includes an obligation to have
regard to the interests of the creditors generally when the company is insolvent ....");
Shandro & Sidle, supra note 258, at 34-35 (explaining this rule under English common law
and speculating that the rule continues under Companies Act 2006).
370. See, e.g., Hallinan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 503, at *32 n.29 (noting that once a
corporation enters the zone of insolvency, the directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporations' creditors, in addition to its shareholders (internal quotation marks omitted));
see also HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 367, § 1083 ("The director's obligation
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Regardless of the beneficiary, can management fulfill its fiduciary duties
in a neutral capacity? A fiduciary generally must "act for the benefit of
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship." 371 In a
management-neutral process, management is reacting to the demands of the
various parties in interest. Management may work to reconcile these
demands, but it rarely is in a position to reject demands wholesale. This
inability to act is particularly acute with respect to the demands of the
distressed debt investor, who potentially may be management's future
employer.
If the company is hopelessly insolvent and its creditors have negotiated
the restructuring plan, perhaps management's inability to act is not an issue.
Management's duties are owed to creditors, and implementing a creditor-
approved plan arguably satisfies these duties. 372 In this respect, removing
management from the process may eliminate agency costs typically
associated with the separation of corporate ownership (here, held by the
creditors) and corporate management. 373
But what if the plan is negotiated only with certain creditors, or the
company's solvency is in dispute? In this situation, it is unclear whether a
supporting or neutral role by management is sufficient to satisfy its
fiduciary obligations. Management, as a fiduciary, is responsible for
pursuing a course of action on behalf of the company that is in the best
to act... in the interests of the company includes an obligation to have regard to the
interests of the creditors generally when the company is... of doubtful solvency or on the
verge of insolvency since in such circumstances it is the creditors' money which is at risk.");
Shandro & Sidle, supra note 258, at 35 (explaining U.K. law and noting that "[tihere is no
indication as to the time when directors should cease to act in the interests of the company
(taking into account the other interests) and consider or act in the creditors' interests"). For a
general discussion of management's fiduciary duties in the zone of insolvency under U.S.
law, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Christopher W. Frost, Managers' Fiduciary Duties in
Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere), 32 J. CORP. L.
491 (2007). Notably, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that directors owe no fiduciary
duties to creditors in the zone of insolvency. See N. Am. Catholic, 930 A.2d at 101 ("When a
solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors
does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders ....").
371. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658-59 (8th ed. 2004); see also HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND, supra note 367, § 1083 n.5 ("'[A] fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act
for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a
relationship of trust and confidence."' (citation omitted)).
372. See supra note 369 and accompanying text (discussion of management's fiduciary
duties to creditors).
373. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933) ("The separation of ownership from control produces a
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge,
and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
disappear."); Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing
Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 601 (1993) (explaining that "the agency
relationship [in the corporate form] exposes owners to the risk that managers will use
owners' funds for management's benefit, thereby creating agency costs-the costs to the
principal of obtaining faithful and effective performance by its agent").
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interests of all of the members of the beneficiary class.374 A restructuring
plan negotiated among major creditors may not be in the best interests of
unrepresented creditors or shareholders. Management may need to take a
more assertive role in these instances to protect the beneficiaries of its
duties.
A complete analysis of the impact of a management-neutral restructuring
process on management's fiduciary duties is beyond the scope of this
Article. This issue is likely to arise more frequently in the future as the
strategies developed by activist investors become more common.
5. Continued Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Restructuring Cultures
Another issue related to the convergence of U.S. and U.K. restructuring
processes is the domino effect, if any, on U.S. and U.K. restructuring
cultures. The traditional differences between U.S. and U.K. restructurings
reflect not only different laws, but also distinctly different cultures. The
U.S. culture generally is viewed as more aggressive and contentious. 375
The U.K. culture generally is viewed as more conciliatory. 376  The
differences in culture stem, at least in part, from the perceived
consequences of a bankruptcy filing in the respective countries.
In the United States, a bankruptcy filing may be used by the parties-
both the company and creditors-to facilitate their restructuring goals. 377
Although most companies prefer to avoid a bankruptcy filing, either the
company or its creditors may view a Chapter 11 filing (or the threat of a
filing) as advantageous. U.S. companies and their creditors often negotiate
out of court with the confidence of a Chapter 1 1 backstop. If all else fails,
they can seek to achieve their goals through the Chapter 11 process. As one
of Granite Broadcasting's preferred shareholders explained in an email
374. See supra notes 367-70 and accompanying text (discussion of fiduciary duties).
This concern is particularly acute in the United Kingdom, where management's duties are
owed to the corporation and not specifically to shareholders or creditors. HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND, supra note 367, § 1083.
375. See, e.g., David F.W. Cohen & Maxine M. Kerr, An Overview and Comparison of
the Canadian and American Corporate Reorganization Regimes, Bus. CREDIT, Jan. 2003, at
65, 65 ("American reorganization proceedings are, typically, litigious and protracted in
nature."); Naomi Rownick, UK Law Firms Fail to Cash in on Insolvency and Restructuring,
LAWYER (U.K.), June 9, 2003, at 2 (noting that the American culture is more litigious than
the U.K. culture); see also Katherine Yung, Aggressive Approach: Dallas Firm Is Intense-
Whether It's Hiring, Investing or Litigating, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 2006, at 1 D
(explaining the legal strategies of U.S.-based distressed debt investor, Highland Capital
Management LP, as "filing numerous lawsuits and forcing troubled companies into
involuntary bankruptcy").
376. "Commentators have described the U.K.'s culture generally as being polite,
secretive, and conflict adverse." Kerry Shannon Burke, Regulating Corporate Governance
Through the Market: Comparing the Approaches of the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom, 27 J. CORP. L. 341, 373 (2002).
377. See, e.g., Miller & Waisman, supra note 337, at 181 ("The sooner a trader or group
of traders can force a debtor out of Chapter 11, the sooner they can monetize their claim and
obtain a return on their speculation, without regard to any other factor, including whether or
not the debtor had been fully rehabilitated when it was pushed out of Chapter 11.").
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regarding his failure to respond to Silver Point's proposed out-of-court
restructuring plan, "I'd rather fight in [Chapter] 11. I'd rather have a
battle."378
Companies and creditors take a very different view of a U.K.
administration. These parties often are negotiating with a sense of fear and
uncertainty about the administration process. 379  For management, the
potential loss of control, inability to secure financing, and termination of
key contracts are possible results of an administration. For creditors, the
undeveloped nature of the law and the uncertainty regarding the resolution
of intercreditor disputes gives pause. For all, the filing of an administration
is used as a threat to bring parties to the negotiating table.
The negotiating table itself also is very different in the United Kingdom.
Historically, corporate restructurings in the United Kingdom followed the
"London Approach." This approach basically involved a troubled
company's lenders meeting, agreeing to a standstill, and agreeing to a
restructuring plan for the company.380  The entire process was
accomplished out of court and had the characteristics of a "gentlemen's
agreement." Cooperation and consent were key elements of the process. If
these elements were lacking, the Bank of England would step in to assist. 381
The London Approach worked well for many years in the United
Kingdom, where corporate debt at the time was concentrated in a handful of
financial institutions. 382 Beginning in 2001-2002, the London Approach
fell by the wayside. 383 Corporate debt holdings became less concentrated,
and the public bond markets emerged as an alternative financing source for
U.K. companies. Nevertheless, the consensual and cooperative nature of
the London Approach still guides U.K. restructuring practice. 384
Activist investors looking to invest in both the United States and the
Unitd Kingdom must adapt to the differences in their respective laws and
cultures. A U.S. distressed debt investor operating with a Chapter 11
mindset might find it difficult to achieve its restructuring goals for a U.K.
company. Such an investor does not have a "Chapter I1 "-type backstop in
the United Kingdom. One U.S.-based distressed debt investor, Highberry
Ltd., discovered this fact when it tried to force Colt Telecom Group plc into
an administration to effect a debt-for-equity exchange. 385 The U.K. court
378. In re Granite Broad. Corp., 369 B.R. 120, 136 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
379. See supra Part III.A.2.a; see also Broude et al., supra note 252, at 43 ("As a result of
the many practical difficulties involved in trying to achieve an in-court restructuring in the
UK, consensual out-of-court restructurings[] are the preferred approach whenever
practical.").
380. See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 144, at 219-29 (explaining the London Approach).
381. See, e.g., id. at 220 (explaining role of the Bank of England).
382. See Armour et al., supra note 21, at 1757-59 (explaining London Approach and role
of concentrated debt in that process).
383. See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 144, at 224-25 (discussing limits on approach).
384. Telephone Interviews with U.K. restructuring professionals (June 25, 2007; June 29,
2007; July 13, 2007).
385. Re Colt Telecom Group plc, [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2815, [14] (Eng.) ("What is not in
issue is that a key object of the proposed administration is to achieve what Highberry call[s]
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rejected this approach. 386 Similarly, distressed debt investors investing in
U.S. companies need to have a fighting spirit. In both countries, distressed
debt investors need to understand fully not only the applicable bankruptcy
laws, but also how cultural influences may impact their investment
strategies.
It remains to be seen whether globalization in the distressed debt market
will cause a convergence in restructuring cultures similar to what has
occurred in restructuring processes. Repeat players at the negotiating table
in both the United States and the United Kingdom may facilitate a modified
approach to restructuring negotiations. Alternatively, repeat players may
become knowledgeable and comfortable enough with the different laws and
customs that some divergence of the U.S. and U.K. restructuring cultures
continues. If investors are able to achieve their ultimate goal of profitability
in the current cultures, change may be viewed as unnecessary and
potentially risky.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS
Distressed debt investing is not a new investment strategy. It is,
however, becoming more prominent. Institutional investors have
substantial funds to place in distressed situations, and activist investors are
not hesitant to flex their economic muscle. These investors increasingly are
using distressed debt investments to influence corporate governance and
acquire control of troubled companies. The strategies of activist distressed
debt investors are changing the dynamics of corporate restructurings and
may require troubled companies, other creditors, and legislators to rethink
their approaches to the restructuring process.
A. Potential Winners and Losers in a Management-Neutral
Restructuring Process
The presence of activist investors in a company's capital structure
changes the dynamics of any restructuring. This change occurs whether the
company is based in the United States or the United Kingdom, and, as
discussed above, it primarily affects management's role in the restructuring
process. Management frequently loses control of the process and is
relegated to a more neutral role as a supporting, rather than primary,
participant. Other stakeholders determine the fate of the company, typically
under the strong influence of the activist investor.
Distressed debt investors clearly benefit from this change in U.S. and
U.K. restructuring processes, but the impact on the company, management,
and other stakeholders is less certain. Under a management-neutral process,
distressed debt investors have the opportunity to influence changes at the
'a restructure.' What they actually mean is a transfer of value in the company from the
shareholders to the bondholders-either by conversion of debt to equity or simply by
payment from Colt's cash or both.").
386. See id. at [109] (rejecting administration petition).
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company. These changes can enhance the investors' individual returns and
give the investors control of the company. Moreover, the process is less
regulated than a more traditional shareholder proxy context, which may
allow the investor to influence corporate affairs more quickly, with less
expense, and reduced disclosure obligations. 387
The company also may benefit from a more management-neutral process.
For example, this process may facilitate the removal of historical
management that either was ineffective or contributed to the company's
financial difficulties. It also may eliminate agency costs by effectively
placing management decisions in the hands of the future owners.388 The
potential for value-destructive behavior by distressed debt investors and
other stakeholders, however, creates a potential downside for the
company. 389
Management and minority-interest holders-e.g., junior creditors and
shareholders-are most vulnerable in a management-neutral process.
Management's loss of control, coupled with its existing fiduciary duties,
places management in an awkward position because management may not
be able to adequately fulfill its duties in a neutral or reactive role.390
Management's potential conflicts increase if the distressed debt investor
will control the reorganized company and in turn management's future with
the company. Likewise, minority-interest holders are potentially prejudiced
by management's inability to act on their behalf. The perilous position of
minority-interest holders is further exacerbated by their lack of
representation or leverage at the restructuring negotiating table.
B. Potential Consequences of a Management-Neutral
Restructuring Process
Despite the potential downside for the company, management, and
minority-interest holders, a trend toward a management-neutral
restructuring process is emerging in the United States and the United
Kingdom. This trend reflects a convergence of the traditionally
management-driven U.S. process and the traditionally management-
displacing U.K. process. It also will likely affect the results of U.S. and
U.K. restructurings and could affect their respective bankruptcy laws.
For example, a management-neutral restructuring process led by activist
investors most likely will focus on speed and maximizing the investors'
return. This focus suggests that prepackaged restructuring plans or going-
concern asset sales may become the preferred restructuring methods.
Traditional U.S. stand-alone restructurings in Chapter 1 1 and traditional
U.K. piecemeal asset sales in administration do not necessarily foster
387. For a general discussion of proxy solicitation rules and the use of proxy contests by
hedge funds, see Briggs, supra note 341.
388. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Part III.B.3.
390. See supra Part III.C.4.
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investors' objectives. Consequently, one would expect to see more
nontraditional restructurings in the United States and the United Kingdom.
A trend toward more nontraditional restructuring methods is emerging.
In the United States, prepackaged or prenegotiated plans and, in particular,
going-concern asset sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code are
becoming more common.391 This change in restructuring methods has
received considerable attention in the past ten years. 392 Admittedly, this
change is not attributable solely to activist distressed debt investing or a
more management-neutral restructuring process. Nevertheless, the
increasing influence of activist investors should be considered as a
contributing factor to the change.
Moreover, historical experiences with creditor-controlled situations in the
United Kingdom suggest that quicker results may accompany increased
creditor control in the restructuring context. For example, prior to the
revisions to the Insolvency Act, creditors holding a floating charge over a
company's assets could cut their losses and maximize their return by
appointing an administrative receiver to liquidate the company's assets. 393
Likewise, under the London Approach, creditors worked together to
restructure the company's financial affairs quickly in an out-of-court
setting.394  Accordingly, the distressed debt investors' preference to
negotiate out of court and then pursue the quickest means of
implementation, whether through a Chapter 11 case, an administration, or
an out-of-court process, is not surprising.
Although pursuing restructurings in a traditional U.K. creditor-controlled
manner may provide a quick return, it may not provide the best or desired
return for the distressed debt investor. For this reason, U.K. restructurings
in a more management-neutral process likely will focus more on
maximizing corporate value than its historical counterpart, particularly
when the investor is interested in a debt-for-equity exchange. This focus
will encourage reorganization, rather than liquidation, alternatives. In
addition, when coupled with the traditional U.K. values of speed and
minimal judicial oversight, this focus likely will encourage new and
innovative restructuring methods. The prepackaged administration is a
prime example of a nontraditional restructuring method that fosters the
objectives of most distressed debt investors.
391. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 69, 72-81 (2004) (citing the increase in prenegotiated plans and section 363 asset sales
in Chapter 11 cases as signaling the end of traditional corporate reorganizations under the
Bankruptcy Code).
392. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55
STAN. L. REV. 751 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response
to Baird & Rasmussen's The End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003); Harvey R.
Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2005);
Sprayregen et al., supra note 212, at 60.
393. For a general discussion of administrative receivership, see FINCH, supra note 144, at
234-72.
394. See supra Part II.C.5.
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C. Potential Responses to a Management-Neutral Restructuring Process
As discussed above, the emerging trend toward a management-neutral
restructuring process is changing U.S. and U.K. restructurings. Do these
changes warrant or require any type of legislative response? The answer
depends largely on the goals of the underlying insolvency regime.395 If the
goal is to rehabilitate troubled companies and to let management control the
rehabilitation process, then legislative change might be needed. If the goal
is to ensure equitable distributions to junior creditors and shareholders, then
legislative change also might be needed. If the goal is to maximize
corporate value and utility, however, then arguably legislative change is not
required.
Management-led corporate rehabilitation is possible, in theory, under
current U.S. and U.K. law. The debtor-in-possession concept facilitates this
possibility under Chapter 11, and CVAs, Schemes, and general corporate
law provide a similar opportunity under U.K. law. Nevertheless, each of
these structures permit, if not encourage, substantial creditor involvement.
Creditor involvement can lead to creditor control. Accordingly, a
legislative fix, if desired in this context, would need to eliminate or severely
restrict creditor involvement in the restructuring process. 396
An example of such a legislative scheme is France's safeguard
procedure. 397 The safeguard procedure is a court-supervised restructuring
process that may be invoked only by the legal representative of a solvent
company. Management remains in control of the company, and the judicial
administrator, appointed to assist management, "has no specific duties to
creditors. '398 The safeguard procedure does provide for two statutory
creditors' committees, but these committees have limited rights in the
process and can only act to bind members of the committee. 399 The CEO of
the Eurotunnel Group invoked France's safeguard procedure and stayed in
395. See Hamer, supra note 8, at 105-06 (discussing potential legislative responses to
activist distressed debt investing in the United States in light of the Bankruptcy Code's dual
goals of debtor rehabilitation and creditor recovery maximization).
396. Lender involvement in the affairs of a distressed company currently is subject to
judicial restraint under theories such as lender liability, equitable subordination,
recharacterization, and deepening insolvency. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 17, at
939-40. In addition, in Chapter 11, a court can designate an entity's vote on the plan if the
entity's acceptance or rejection of the plan was not in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e)
(2006).
397. See C. COM. art. L620-1 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH COMMERCIAL CODE IN
ENGLISH 423 (Philip Raworth trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2006); see also 2 DOING BUSINESS
IN FRANCE § 18.03 (2006), available at LEXIS, Doing Business in France File (explaining
safeguard procedure).
398. Broude et al., supra note 252, at 44; see also 2 DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra
note 397, §§ 18.03[2], [3][g][ii].
399. See Broude et al., supra note 252, at 44; 2 DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note
397, § 18.03[2].
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control of Eurotunnel's restructuring process, despite the presence of both
U.S. and U.K. distressed debt investors.400
France's safeguard procedure, however, does not completely isolate
management from creditor influence. For example, the restructuring plan
must be approved by the committees.40 1 With respect to creditors not on
the committees, the company must obtain their consent to the plan or
provide such creditors the proscribed statutory treatment-i.e., payment in
full over a ten-year period.40 2 Moreover, shareholders must consent to any
impairment of their interests. 40 3 Presumably, management's control could
be enhanced by adjusting the payment terms for nonconsenting creditors or
providing a similar cramdown mechanism applicable to both creditors and
shareholders.
Notably, what weakens management's ultimate control under France's
safeguard procedure strengthens the protection of junior creditors' and
shareholders' interests. Accordingly, a government considering insolvency
legislation and desiring to protect these interests might enact similar
legislation. The difficulty with crafting such legislation is finding the
appropriate balance between protecting minority interests and fostering
corporate rehabilitation. Whether France's safeguard procedure strikes the
appropriate balance remains to be seen.
Alternatively, an insolvency regime concerned more with minority
interests and less with management control might focus on legislation that
enhances the protection of these interests in nontraditional restructurings.
For example, a statutory scheme could be developed that permits, and in
turn regulates the terms of, prenegotiated asset sales. 404 The scheme could
require the retention of an independent restructuring professional who
would be responsible for reviewing the terms of the proposed transaction,
ascertaining a fair valuation of the company, and providing full disclosure
to the court regarding the terms of the transaction and the results of the
professional's due diligence. The scheme also could require that a certain
400. Eurotunnel's chairman, Jacques Gounon, controlled Eurotunnel's restructuring and
managed to retain 13% of the company for existing shareholders. See, e.g., Alistair Osborne,
'How We Won Fight to Save Eurotunnel,' DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 30, 2007, at 33,
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2811328/%27How-we-won-fight-
to-save-Eurotunnel%27.html (explaining Gounon's control over the process); Ian Watson,
Light at the End of the Chunnel, BUSINESS (U.K.), June 2, 2007, available at LEXIS, The
Business File ("Gounon has given the business world a virtuoso performance in arm-twisting
and brinkmanship."). Gounon used France's safeguard procedure to Eurotunnel's
advantage. See Osborne, supra (explaining that "[t]he [safeguard] procedure gave judicial
teeth to Mr. Gounon's brinkmanship and bravado").
401. See 2 DoING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 397, § 18.03[3][g].
402. See id.
403. See Broude et al., supra note 252, at 49.
404. The scheme suggested here would be designed to facilitate quick approval and
implementation of prenegotiated asset sales. The specifics of the scheme could be varied to
add protection for minority interests or to enable further sales to new investors. For a
proposed legislative scheme that would permit nonplan asset sales under the current Chapter
11 process, see George W. Kuney, Let's Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale
Process as an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1265 (2004).
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percentage of the transaction value be set aside for unsecured creditors, that
a certain number of employees continue with the new business, or that
existing shareholders receive some minority interest in the new business.
The protections afforded to minority interests could vary depending on the
valuation of the company or the priorities of the legislature. The scheme
could allow for quick implementation-e.g., a mandatory court hearing
within twenty days of the filing of the case and the professional's report.
Court oversight, even on an expedited time table, would provide additional
protection to minority interests.
A legislative response similar to that described above would incorporate
several of the techniques currently being used by companies and distressed
debt investors outside of Chapter I I and administration proceedings. For
example, the contemplated out-of-court negotiations mirror a prepackaged
Chapter 11, and the selection of a restructuring professional mirrors a
prepackaged administration. The proposed scheme, however, enhances
these two existing proceedings by streamlining the process and establishing
more definitive rules to govern approval of the transaction and the rights of
minority-interest holders.
The foregoing discussion presumes that the underlying insolvency
regime requires or demands a legislative solution, but it may not. The
current practices of distressed debt investors may maximize corporate
value, which may be the ultimate goal of the insolvency regime. The
transaction value generated in restructurings largely is driven by the market.
Distressed debt investors vying for control pay market value for the
company or risk being outbid by other investors monitoring distressed
situations. In fact, competition among distressed debt investors may
increase the market value of the company.405 The ultimate question of
impact on corporate value is one that can be answered only through further
empirical research and analysis.
CONCLUSION
The emerging influence of activist investors in the corporate restructuring
process raises a new set of policy issues for U.S. and U.K. policy makers to
consider. Activist investors are changing the restructuring landscape and
offering alternative rescue opportunities for troubled companies. Their
activism, however, also raises questions regarding the appropriate role of
management in the restructuring process, the protection of minority-interest
405. Whether the market sufficiently protects minority interests is open to debate. For
example, if the market determines that the value of the company is insufficient to provide a
return on minority interests, then presumably minority interests are not entitled to a return.
This position, however, relies on existing priority schemes and on the validity of market
indicators. For a discussion of a market approach to value maximization in corporate
restructurings, see Sprayregen et al., supra note 212, at 60-62. See also Hamer, supra note 8,
at 105-06 (suggesting that markets complement, but should not replace, legislation
governing the debtor-creditor relationship, at least in the context of activist distressed debt
investing).
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holders, and the creation or destruction of corporate value. This Article sets
the stage for the necessary public policy debate by describing the
investment practices and strategies of activist investors and analyzing how
activist distressed debt investing is changing the dynamics of corporate
restructuring processes in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The results of this policy debate may differ in the United States and the
United Kingdom based on the historical goals of their bankruptcy laws. For
example, a legislative response to create a more balanced playing field
among distressed debt investors, the company, and the company's other
stakeholders may further the traditional dual goals of corporate
rehabilitation and creditor recovery maximization underlying the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.406  A legislative response, however, may not be
necessary in an insolvency regime that focuses solely on creditor recovery
maximization or that facilitates creditor control in troubled situations. The
continued reluctance of U.K. legislators to adopt a debtor-in-possession
insolvency structure may foreshadow a reluctance to interfere with the
increased creditor control fostered by activist distressed debt investors.40 7
Distressed debt investors have a role to play in corporate restructurings.
The policy debate encouraged by this Article should help define the
appropriate parameters of this role. It also should assist corporate
management and other stakeholders in assessing the changing tenor of the
restructuring processes in the United States and the United Kingdom. Even
in the United States, a troubled company no longer can initiate restructuring
negotiations with the confidence that its management will control the
process. If an activist investor is involved, it likely will emerge as the
dominant party at the negotiating table.
406. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
407. See supra Part III.A.2.
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